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Although the American invasion of the francophone British territories of Canada 
in 1775 and the Illinois Country in 1778 had radically different endings, the course of the 
invasions were remarkably similar.  Each was defensive in nature, intended to preempt 
attacks on the colony of New York from Canada and the Virginia county of Kentucky 
from Illinois.  Each featured charismatic and gifted commanders, Brigadier General 
Richard Montgomery in Canada and Lieutenant Colonel George Rogers Clark in the 
Illinois Country, who understood that a critical part of their respective missions was to 
win the hearts of the French populace and turn them into allies against the British if 
possible.  Each featured early and relatively easy victories; in bloodless conquests, 
Montgomery took Montreal and Clark took the French villages of Kaskaskia, Cahokia, 
and Vincennes.  Each suffered setbacks, as British governor Guy Carleton escaped the 
Continental occupation of Montreal to lead the defense of Quebec, and British lieutenant 
governor Henry Hamilton of Detroit organized a counterattack on Vincennes as a base to 
retake the Illinois Country from Clark.  However, Montgomery led a long and fruitless 
siege of Quebec before dying in a desperate attempt to take the city, while Clark’s similar 
desperation play broke Hamilton’s defense of Vincennes and secured a substantial part of 
the Old Northwest for the nascent United States. 
This work is a rare if not unique comparative study of the two invasions.  After 
considering the relative conditions of each in terms of backgrounds, religious 




crucial difference is found to be that the Illinois Country bordered on Spanish 
possessions, which provided Spain with the opportunity to use its resources and influence 
to damage its ancient enemy by assisting Clark and his Virginians, while no such aid 
awaited Montgomery in Canada. 
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There are striking parallels between the American invasions of the conquered 
French provinces of the British Empire, Canada in 1775 and the pays des Illinois, the 
Illinois Country, in 1778.  Each was undertaken as a primarily defensive measure against 
British exploitation of perceived vulnerabilities along the American frontier.  In the case 
of Canada, the New England colonists feared that the British would take advantage of an 
easy invasion route down the Richelieu River and Lakes Champlain and George.  They 
would almost certainly bring the Hurons, the Caughanawa, and other allied Native 
American tribes in tow, and perhaps even French militia, who might have been won over 
to the side of the British by the concessions of the 1774 Quebec Act.1  The Virginian 
settlers of Kentucky, for their part, knew that the British had unleashed hostile Algonquin 
warriors onto the “dark and bloody ground,” and were convinced that the French towns 
along the Mississippi served as staging areas for Native raids.2  Early decisive successes 
led the commanders of each expedition, Major General Richard Montgomery in Canada 
and Lieutenant Colonel George Rogers Clark in the Illinois Country, to aspire to the 
conquest of not only the territories of their respective campaigns, but the hearts and 
minds of the predominantly French inhabitants.3  However, the two campaigns ended 
very differently.  Montgomery was killed in a desperate assault on Quebec City on 
December 31, 1775, leading to Continental forces having abandoned Canada by June of 
1776, while Clark became known as the “conqueror of the Illinois” after having forced 
                                                 
1 Mark R. Anderson, The Battle for the Fourteenth Colony:  America’s War of Liberation in Canada, 1774-
1776 (Hanover, NH:  University Press of New England, 2013), Kindle Edition, ch. 5, locs. 1161-1175. 
2George Rogers Clark, The Conquest of the Illinois (Waxkeep Publishing, 2013), Kindle Edition, locs. 264-
274. 
3 Anderson, ch. 11, loc. 3131; Clarence Walsworth Alvord, The Illinois Country: 1673-1818 (Chicago:  A. 




the surrender of the last British redoubt in the Illinois Country and taken lieutenant 
governor Henry Hamilton and his garrison prisoner.  In the course of comparing these 
two campaigns, it will become apparent that the diplomatic, logistical, and economic 
environments were remarkably similar, but the presence of one critical difference – an 
accident of geography – was a critical element in the success of the Illinois campaign, as 
opposed to the invasion of Canada. 
Given the paucity of literature comparing the Canadian and Illinois campaigns, 
the bodies of work on each must be considered separately.  Regarding Canada, one must 
begin with the work against which all future histories of that nation would be defined, the 
Histoire du Canada of François-Xavier Garneau, completed in 1848.  Not a classically 
trained historian, Garneau was attracted to history as a practical endeavor by the work of 
French historian Jules Michelet, who was in turn a devotee of historical theories of the 
Italian philologist and philosopher Giambattista Vico, whose Nuova Scienza Michelet 
had translated into French.4  Vico held that the foundational myths of a nation, formed 
through a union of primal historical and linguistic facts, were necessary in order to 
sustain it, and Garneau was not slow to see the possibilities of a Canadian foundational 
myth based on the historical struggle of the French against the British in Canada to retain 
its language and culture.5  
Accordingly, Garneau’s summation of the British motivations of the Quebec Act 
of 1774, which radically expanded French Catholic freedoms and was cited as a casus 
                                                 
4 Serge Gagnon, trans. Yves Brunelle, Quebec and its Historians, 1840 to 1920 (Montreal:  Harvest House, 
1982), 9. 
5 Giambattista Vico, trans. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch, The New Science of 
Giambattista Vico (Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 1968), 116; Pierre Savard, “François-Xavier 
Garneau,” in Laurier L. LaPierre, ed., Four O’Clock Lectures:  French-Canadian Thinkers of the 




bello in the Declaration of Independence, was that it was meant strictly to keep the 
French Canadians from joining the Americans, and to soften the attitude of the people 
toward taxation.6  When discussing the attitude of the Canadian habitants, or peasant 
farmers, toward the Americans, he noted that “they ever preserved in their hearts that 
hatred for the British race . . . viewing both alike as one body of turbulent and ambitious 
oppressors.”7  Garneau did admit the popularity of the governor, Sir Guy Carleton, but 
reserved his scorn for the British merchants who had come to Canada to use British law 
to dispossess the French inhabitants.8  When speaking of British “malcontents” leaving 
Quebec during the American siege, Garneau sneered that they retired to their homes “to 
await the result of the leaguer, and hail it with a cry of God save the King! or The 
Congress forever! according to circumstances.”9. 
On the other side of the spectrum is Hilda Neatby, Companion of the Order of 
Canada and author of Quebec:  The Revolutionary Age, 1760-1791.  As opposed to 
Garneau’s portrait of cowardly and treacherous British merchants, a manipulative and 
deceitful metropolitan government in London, and a popular but mistrustful governor, 
Neatby argues that the British merchant class were made promises that Carleton twisted 
and ignored instructions from London to deny them.10  Neatby agrees with Garneau that 
Carleton planned to establish an autocratic government in Quebec with which he could 
threaten the Atlantic colonies into submission, but whereas Garneau believed that the 
ultimate aim was to disenfranchise the French, Neatby accuses him of attempting to 
                                                 
6 François-Xavier Garneau, trans. Andrew Bell, History of Canada from the Time of Its Discovery till the 
Union Year 1840-41 (Montreal:  John Lovell, 1862), 2:128. 
7 Garneau, 2:128. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., 137. 





deprive British subjects of their liberties in order to forestall revolution in both Canada 
and the American colonies and of trying to establish a despotic model for the remainder 
of the colonies, which was what the southern colonists themselves believed.11  Whereas 
Garneau was an overt apostle of French Canada, Neatby repeatedly remarks that a slow 
drift toward anglicization would have been more just and, ultimately, more humane for 
the French themselves.12  Regarding the American invasion, as opposed to Garneau 
dismissing the British merchants, she points out that Carleton belatedly recognized their 
value.13 
Between these poles lie two works of the same name, Canada and the American 
Revolution, one written by George M. Wrong in 1934 and the other by Gustave Lanctot 
in 1967.  Wrong concedes Neatby’s point that Carleton’s strategy was based on the idea 
that the only way to keep Canada British was to encourage its French character; unlike 
Neatby, though, he believed that Carleton’s reasoning was both sound and justifiable.14  
Wrong approached the question not so much in terms of equity toward the French as he 
did British interests in keeping Canada, although he did address the fundamental 
unfairness of disenfranchising the French Catholics under the Test Act.15  Lanctot is more 
sympathetic to the French cause; his criticism, in which he echoes Simon Sanguinet, a 
Loyalist notary in Montreal at the time of the invasion, is that Carleton was timid and too 
respectful of British rights to stop the Continental propaganda that preceded the invasion 
and to take stronger measures against the invaders and their supporters in Canada once 
                                                 
11 Neatby, 107-108. 
12 Ibid., 107. 
13 Ibid., 150. 
14 George M. Wrong, Canada and the American Revolution:  The Disruption of the First British Empire 
(New York:  Cooper Square Publishers, 1968), 281-282 




the operation began.16  Lanctot is willing to give Carleton and the British government 
credit for the Quebec Act, but is critical of the fact that it was so slow in coming that it 
was issued only on the eve of the Revolution, which led many Canadians to believe the 
charge that it was intended to rally support for the government against the Atlantic 
colonists.17 
In The Idea of Liberty in Canada during the Age of Atlantic Revolutions, Michel 
Ducharme makes the case that in the conflict between a “republican liberty” reminiscent 
of Hobbes or Rousseau, in which the liberty of a free people was entirely vested in an 
elected assembly, and a “modern liberty” in which institutions existed to protect 
individual liberties, the Canadians had preferred modern liberty, which aligned more with 
the British model of administration.18   In this telling, the educated classes, having 
understood that ceding their individual rights to a representative body placed their culture 
in jeopardy in the future as more and more British subjects arrived, rejected the risks 
involved in accepting the Continental republican ideal in favor of the more authoritarian 
model of the British governor and his mostly compliant council that they were certain 
would protect their individual rights.19  Without the strong backing of this elite, the 
Continental invasion could not succeed, although its principles would not be forgotten in 
future events. 
In The Battle for the Fourteenth Colony, Mark R. Anderson refers to the 
Continental invasion of Canada as the first American “war of liberation,” presaging 
                                                 
16 Gustave Lanctot, Canada and the American Revolution, 1774-1783 (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard 
University Press, 1967), 86-87. 
17 Ibid., 54. 
18 Michel Ducharme, trans. Peter Feldstein, The Idea of Liberty in Canada during the Age of Atlantic 
Revoluitons, 1776-1838 (Montreal:  McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2014), 37-38. 




interventions in Cuba, Latin America, and the Middle East.20  Unlike any of the above-
mentioned authors, Anderson makes the case that the subtext of the invasion was 
ideological rather than strategic or conquest-oriented.21  Like Neatby, Anderson is 
sympathetic toward the largely pro-American British merchant class, making the case 
that their adherence to what they considered to be British rights was a valid viewpoint 
that happened to have lost the war, as opposed to immoral or venal, similar to most 
Tories in the Atlantic colonies during the Revolution.22  Similar to Garneau, though, 
Anderson concedes that Carleton made the correct strategic decision to cultivate the 
French clergy and seigneurs, whom although reduced in stature after the British invasion 
were still able to hold the French merchants and just enough of the habitants fast to the 
British cause to deny the Continentals the committees of correspondence and the regional 
elective legislative bodies that would have fully cemented their hold on the parts of the 
country that they controlled.23 
Regarding the Illinois Country, Clark’s memoirs are the logical place to begin.  
Although the usual caveats concerning self-interest have to be borne in mind, they are 
accurate and verifiable in their broad outlines, and have been taken at close to face value 
by most of the historians that followed him.  Clark’s objectives in launching the invasion 
of the Illinois Country are presented straightforwardly:  he believed that the British were 
using the Illinois French to organize and train Indian raiding parties to send into 
Kentucky, and he intended to stop it by neutralizing any British officials or French 
                                                 
20 Anderson, Introduction, loc. 110. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., loc. 136. 




traders using their influence in that manner.24  If in the meantime he could convince the 
French to join with the Americans, so much the better, but by his own account he was 
uninterested in a “war of liberation” such as Anderson thought the invasion of Canada 
represented.25 
Clark’s version of events is uncritically reproduced in the first major historical 
work on the state of Illinois, written by John Reynolds, the former governor of the state 
who had prosecuted the Black Hawk War, in 1852.26  In his magisterial work The Illinois 
Country, written in 1920 as part of a centennial series on the state’s history, Clarence 
Walsworth Alvord does so as well, but unlike Reynolds he makes use of other sources to 
present a fully rounded picture of the conquest.  Among other details, Alvord points out 
that Clark knew that he was not entering the Illinois Country with no friends or resources 
in place; he had a spy, Thomas Bentley, in Kaskaskia, the largest town in the pays des 
Illinois, and a Spanish emissary to the Continental Congress had been made aware of the 
expedition and had promised assistance from St. Louis upon Clark’s arrival.27  One 
account on which Alvord is more sharply critical than is Reynolds is the treatment of the 
French after the conquest of the Illinois, although even here he does not blame Clark 
directly.  While Reynolds attributes the decline of the French in Illinois to their inability 
to function at an Anglo-Saxon tempo, Alvord meticulously details the ways in which the 
French were defrauded and often terrorized by the American administrators and 
merchants that succeeded Clark.28 
                                                 
24 Clark, ch. 1, loc. 273. 
25 Ibid., 379. 
26 John Reynolds, The Pioneer History of Illinois (Whitefish, MT:  Kessinger Legacy Reprints, 1887), 85-
86. 
27 Alvord, 324, 330. 




One author who takes decided issue with Clark’s account, and those who have 
accepted it as the basis of their own histories, is Richard White, a MacArthur Foundation 
fellow and author of The Middle Ground, which opened an important new perspective on 
the relations between Europeans and Indians in the pays des Illinois and the further 
reaches of the Old Northwest, around the modern states of Iowa, Michigan, and parts of 
Indiana and Ohio, as well as the southern portion of Ontario, known collectively as the 
pays d’en haut.29  White’s concept of the middle ground is as much conceptual as it is 
geographical; it refers to the ways in which language, symbols, and rituals were borrowed 
and mutually transformed to become a common space through which Europeans, 
particularly the French but also to lesser extents the British, Spanish, and Americans, 
could share meaning.30  In White’s telling, Clark’s gift was that his experiences with 
fighting the Shawnee and Miami in Kentucky gave his certain narrow insights into the 
“middle ground” created by the creative friction in the pays des Illinois and the pays d’en 
haut to the north. He was able to transcend the weaknesses of his understanding by 
reassuming the role of a war leader when he failed to understand or express the intricate 
diplomacy expected of a chief.31  His curse was that for all of his diplomatic posturing, he 
never understood what was required to grow beyond the confines of a war leader, and 
therefore was not able to consolidate his diplomatic gains, even to the extent of launching 
an expedition against Detroit, his ultimate objective.32   
                                                 
29 Richard White, The Middle Ground:  Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-
1815 (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2011), 1. 
30 White, xxx-xxxi. 
31 White, 370. 




Moreover, according to White, Clark’s bitter experiences in Kentucky had 
rendered him an “Indian hater,” incapable of considering the Indians in any capacity 
other than wild animals or barbaric foes.33  By contrast, White holds that after some early 
missteps, the British commanders had begun to learn the intricacies of the middle ground 
that had been mastered by the French, in large part by learning from the French 
themselves.34  Although initially hostile to the British, the Shawnee, Miami, Potawatomi, 
and the tribes of the old Illinois Confederacy were placated by the patient diplomacy and 
experienced hands of Sir William Johnson, the Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the 
Northern Department, and his deputy in the West, George Croghan, and the traditional 
relationship between “fathers” and “children” that had dominated the history of relations 
between the French and the Natives was partially suborned by the British.35  As a result, 
Hamilton, who like most western officers did not share Carleton’s scruples regarding the 
employment of Native American warriors.  He assembled an effective fighting force for 
the occupation of Vincennes, although he was forced to adopt the tactics of the middle 
ground to keep his force together.36  Although the town surrendered without resistance, 
Hamilton was unable to employ them when Clark struck back, having released them due 
to the lateness of the season. 
Carl Ekberg, professor emeritus of Illinois colonial history at Illinois State 
University and two-time winner of the Kemper and Leila Williams Prize in Louisiana 
history, agrees with White’s assessment of Clark, calling him an “Indian killer” in his 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 368. 
34 Ibid., 349. 
35 Ibid. 




work St. Louis Rising.37  Ekberg sharply contrasts Clark’s character with that of Louis St. 
Ange de Bellerive, last commandant of Fort de Chartres and longtime administrator of 
Spanish St. Louis; Ekberg claims that “the very notion of race as it came to be elaborated 
in the nineteenth century was alien to St. Ange, as it generally was to all persons of 
French extraction living in the Illinois Country,” presumably in contrast to the 
encroaching Americans.38  In French Roots in the Illinois Country, he makes the claim 
that in terms of community and agriculture as well as race, Clark came and went without 
leaving a permanent mark on French society in the pays des Illinois; it was only in the 
subsequent migrations from the east a few years later that the culture of the Illinois 
French became undermined.39   
 In Susan Sleeper-Smith’s Indian Women and French Men, she provides an 
alternate explanation of Native American behavior during Clark’s adventure.  Beyond the 
reluctance of the Potawatomi to become involved in the conflict between the British and 
the “Long Knives,” as the Algonquins called the Virginians of Kentucky, the British had 
offered a serious affront to the Potawatomi at St. Joseph, a community largely comprised 
of métis, or children of mixed French and native ancestry:  they had removed the family 
of Louis and Marie-Madeleine Chevalier, ostensibly on suspicion of collaboration with 
hostile Native elements but more likely to supplant their trading operation on behalf of 
British merchants.40  Marie-Madeleine Chevalier was a métis of considerable regional 
influence; she had previously been married to a Kaskaskia merchant named 
                                                 
37 Carl J. Ekberg and Sharon Person, St. Louis Rising:  The French Regime of Louis St. Ange de Bellerive 
(Urbana, IL:  University of Illinois Press, 2015), 207. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Carl J. Ekberg, French Roots in the Illinois Country:  The Mississippi Frontier in Colonial Times 
(Urbana, IL:  University of Illinois Press, 2000), 250-251. 
40 Susan Sleeper-Smith, Indian Women and French Men:  Rethinking Cultural Encounter in the Western 




l’Archevêque, and due largely to her influence, Louis was a successful trader as well. Her 
daughters in turn had each married other French traders, all of whom were enriched by 
the connections of mére et filles to the Potawatomi and other indigenous Algonquin 
tribes.41  Sleeper-Smith describes a far-flung familial trade network reaching from St. 
Joseph in the pays d’en haut to Cahokia in the pays des Illinois, largely matriarchal in 
nature, which pursued its own agenda and played a role that attracted little notice from 
Europeans but which played an important role in the development of the Illinois 
campaign. 
Two historians of the city of St. Louis, Frederick Fausz in Founding St. Louis and 
Stephen Kling and his collaborators in The Battle of St. Louis and the Attack on Cahokia, 
describe the influence upon events of the Spanish government of the city.  Ekberg 
addresses the Spanish occupation in the wake of the French and Indian War and the 
modus vivendi eventually reached by the French inhabitants and their new Spanish 
governors, and Alvord noted the communication between the Americans and the Spanish 
on the eve of Clark’s venture, along with the friendship between Clark and the Spanish 
lieutenant governor Fernando de Leyba.  However, Fausz notes the extent to which the 
war raised the profile of the still young capital of Upper Louisiana, as well as the 
commercial nexus formed by family alliances across both sides of the Mississippi, which 
was placed by the Spanish at the service of the Continentals, even though in 1778 the 
Spanish were still technically a neutral party.42  For his part, Kling places the Illinois 
conflict, especially in its later stages, in the context of two major regional campaigns in 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 46-49. 
42 J. Frederick Fausz, Founding St. Louis:  First City of the New West (Charleston, SC:  The History Press, 




which it played a part.  The first was the successful attack of Bernardo Galvez, the 
Spanish governor at New Orleans, upon the British posts of Manchac and Baton Rouge to 
the north of New Orleans, then upon Mobile and Pensacola, the strongholds of British 
West Florida, as the Spanish officially entered the war in 1779.43  The second was the 
British counterattack, which was designed to recover all of the possessions lost to the 
Virginians and the Spanish in one fell swoop, and in addition to eliminate the Spanish as 
a factor in Upper Louisiana by seizing St. Louis and the older settlement of Ste. 
Genevieve to the south as well.44  The two authors thus emphasize the nature of the 
American Revolution in the West as an imperial struggle as well as a war of 
independence, and remark at some length on the involvement of the Spanish in Clark’s 
invasion. 
The present work will weave the two narratives of the American campaigns in 
Canada and the Illinois Country into a series of comparisons, which will demonstrate the 
remarkable similarities between the two.  First, a broad overview will be given of Canada 
and the pays des Illinois from the fall of New France and the cession of Canada and 
Louisiana to the British and Spanish in 1763 to the eve of the American Revolution in 
1775.  It will be shown that in each instance, self-interested and incompetent governance 
eventually gave way to more humane and enlightened efforts on the part of the British, 
although this happened more quickly in Quebec than it did the Illinois administrative 
centers of Fort de Chartres and later the city of Kaskaskia.  Initial disdain for what were 
perceived as castoffs of the former Bourbon empire turned to chagrin as the British 
                                                 
43 Stephen L. Kling, Jr., Kristine J. Sjostrom, and Marysia T. Lopez, The Battle of St. Louis, The Attack on 
Cahokia, and the American Revolution in the West (St. Louis:  THGC Publishing, 2017), 36-38. 




realized that their new subjects were fleeing for the exits, and as a result the British 
administrators either tolerated or encouraged French language, culture, and most 
surprising to the French, religion.  Carleton cultivated the seigneurs and the clergy as his 
interlocutors with the Canadian people, and the later British commandants of the Illinois 
Country, most notably Captain Hugh Lord, the last British officer stationed there, 
attempted to do the same with the local merchants standing in for the gentry.  However, 
they found that few were left to speak for them.  In the chaotic environment in the Illinois 
after its cession, the Spanish were able to lure one-third of the French population to the 
west bank of the Mississippi, including the majority of its wealthier inhabitants. 
Next will be considered the state of the Church in the two francophone regions.  
In Canada, after an early attempt to establish the Test Act barring Catholics from public 
service along with other instruments of Anglican hegemony, Carleton and the London 
government began a slow string of concessions that culminated in the Quebec Act of 
1774 and its promise of full equality of opportunity for Catholics in Canada.  These 
included permission for a bishop to be installed with the approval of the governor, and in 
due course Jean-Olivier Briand became bishop of Quebec.  Briand well understood his 
unique position in British dominions, as nowhere else under British rule, including 
Ireland, was allowed a bishop; moreover, he knew that what London had given it could 
take away.  Accordingly, he became one of the governor’s staunchest allies as well as one 
of his few friends.  This may have ensured the prosperity of the Canadian Church, but it 
also opened Briand and the clergy to charges of overstepping their pastoral bounds and 
engaging in politics, which ignited a smoldering anticlerical sentiment among the 




general, upheld his policy; however, due to the Church’s purge of the Society of Jesus, he 
was the sole priest in the region.  When help finally did arrive in the form of a young and 
energetic priest named Pierre Gibault, Meurin found that Gibault was considered by the 
bishop to be recalcitrant, and Gibault was more often to be found on the Spanish bank of 
the Mississippi, away from the control of Briand and Meurin, than in the dangerous 
western hinterlands of his territory.  When Clark arrived, he found Gibault to be 
indispensable in his service, to Briand’s chagrin. 
From there, relationships with the Native Americans will be examined.  Other 
than a bloodless show of force at the British post of Vincennes on the Wabash River, 
which had been occupied by the Virginians, and a fruitless attack on St. Louis and 
Cahokia, the second city of the pays des Illinois after Kaskaskia, the Indians played a 
small role in the hostilities in both Canada and the Illinois Country.  For the most part, 
this was by design; Montgomery, Carleton, and Clark wanted nothing to do with Indian 
warfare, having each been repulsed by encounters with it at various points of their 
careers.  This was not true of the British lieutenant governors in the west, notably Henry 
Hamilton at Detroit, Arent de Peyster and Patrick Sinclair at Michilimackinac, and 
Philippe de Rastel, sieur de Rocheblave, commanding under the British at Kaskaskia.  
These men had each served for considerable periods of time in the western posts and had 
grown quite comfortable with the tribes in their vicinities; Rocheblave had been a French 
trader before his employment with the British, and the others had learned well from the 
French of their acquaintances.  Hamilton in particular was known as the “Hair Buyer” 
because he was known to pay for the scalps of victims of Indian raids in Kentucky.  




the Ojibwe, and others were countered by Spanish agents prior to his arrival, and Clark 
himself dealt with the tribes once upon the scene; Hamilton was forced to come into the 
pays d’en haut himself to recruit the Kickapoo and the Onsetians, and their aid was 
ultimately of limited effectiveness. 
Following that discussion, commercial interests will be considered.  One of the 
critical concerns that Montgomery faced involved the use of Continental paper money in 
Canada.  Due to having been left without recourse when they were forced to accept 
French paper and were subsequently abandoned by the French, all Canadians as well as 
the French in Illinois were left with an abhorrence of paper notes.  As a result, 
Montgomery and Benedict Arnold, who led a supplementary expedition from 
Massachusetts through Maine and into Quebec, had to rely on uncertain shipments of 
specie from the Continental Congress; the invasion entered a new and ominous phase 
when the Army’s hard money ran out and troops in Montreal started forcing merchants 
and habitants to accept Continental notes.  By contrast, the American agent Oliver 
Pollock, operating out of Spanish New Orleans, was able to assemble plentiful credit and 
borrowed specie to send upriver to Clark, and Kaskaskia merchants such as Gabriel Cerré 
and Charles Gratiot were willing to accept Continental notes at face value even though it 
was common knowledge that they were hyperinflated at the time.  Cerré and Gratiot were 
part of the exclusive merchant clique spanning the river, which the Spanish were 
encouraging to assist Clark to the best of their ability. 
Finally, the conflicts themselves will be examined.  With no help from the local 
Indian tribes, both Montgomery and Clark would be dependent upon both the material 




successes in the beginning; Montgomery quickly secured Chambly and St. John’s on the 
Richelieu River, soon followed by Montreal, while Clark bloodlessly took Kaskaskia, 
Cahokia, and smaller towns such as Prairie du Rocher and St-Philippe in between the 
two, along with Vincennes.  Each found enthusiastic supporters, but while with Clark 
they represented a majority of the French, in Montgomery’s case it was a relatively small 
number, the remainder expressing a desire to remain neutral.  When each suffered 
reverses, Carleton escaping to Quebec to lead the city’s defense and Hamilton marching 
from Detroit to seize back Vincennes, they were cognizant of the fact that their own 
forces were unequal to the task of storming their objectives, and looked to the French.  In 
Montgomery’s case, about 500 responded, and these were sufficiently unenthusiastic that 
he would not commit them to battle.  In Clark’s case, on the other hand, the number of 
French volunteers outnumbered his own men, and their presence ensured that the 
Vincennes habitants and many of the Indians would stay out of the fight, whereas the 
majority of the defenders of Quebec were French militia. 
As this summary has shown, the situations in Canada and the Illinois Country 
shared many features, but there were a few important differences:  the small number of 
French merchants in Kaskaskia as opposed to the large seigneurie in Canada; the 
willingness of those merchants that remained in the Illinois Country to join the 
Americans and provide them credit as opposed to the determination of the gentry, clergy, 
and French bourgeoisie to remain loyal to the British and their rejection of Continental 
money; and the loyalty of the French to Clark as opposed to Montgomery.  In each of 




Spain provided the assistance that made Clark’s mission a success where Montgomery’s 






Canada and the pays des Illinois shared a dubious distinction:  Of the three 
belligerent powers – Great Britain, the United Colonies, and Spain – that occupied and 
fought for them, possession of these lands meant less to each of the powers than did 
denying them to one another.  The British had retained possession of Canada and the 
Illinois Country after the French and Indian War mainly to ensure that their old adversary 
France did not regain any toehold on the North American continent.  The Spanish 
grudgingly accepted the French “gift” of Louisiana so their once and future enemies the 
British would not share a border directly on their more valuable western possessions.  
The French regime itself had barely cast a backward glance at them after the Treaty of 
Paris, having considered itself fortunate to have kept Guadeloupe and Martinique in the 
bargain; Voltaire’s judgment of Canada as “quelques arpents de neige” – some acres of 
snow – now seemed more than applicable to the western expanses of the French empire 
in North America as well.45  
As regards the Americans, they would have shown little immediate interest in 
either Canada or the Illinois Country during the Revolutionary War if they had not 
represented potential or actual staging grounds for invasion by the British or the Indians. 
The Atlantic colonists had shown scant interest in Canada after the end of the French and 
Indian War; by 1774 there were just over 1,000 emigrants from the lower colonies, 
mostly traders and merchants expecting that the British governor would extend them 
preferential treatment over the French.46  The Virginians in Kentucky could certainly be 
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land-hungry and acquisitive, but they were already overextended and in a mortal struggle 
with the Shawnee and the Miami, who from the early stages of the Revolution were 
sponsored by the British.  While Clark remarked upon the desirability of Illinois land 
while on the march to Kaskaskia, it was desperation to be free of Indian raids rather than 
the drive for more territory that drove him and his men.47 
The British and Spanish, as had the French before them, soon found that the cost 
of the provinces nearly matched their worth, particularly with expensive Indian 
diplomacy a constant necessity.  Being already in possession of Canada at the end of the 
French and Indian War, the British had already established an ad hoc military 
government, but there was no sense of urgency concerning how the new colony would be 
governed or integrated into the Empire in the long term; a coherent system of governance 
was forced to wait until 1774, with the passage of the Quebec Act.  The Illinois Country 
was a puzzle to the British in London, New York, and eventually Quebec City once it 
was brought under Canadian control by the Quebec Act.  Initially, the French villages 
were left under the control of Louis Bellerive de Saint-Ange, the commandant at Fort de 
Chartres. He in turn scrupulously upheld the new sovereignty of the British to both the 
French and Native American populations of the region, most notably during the uprising 
of several tribes under the Ottawa chieftain Pontiac in 1763. Saint-Ange denied Pontiac 
supplies or shelter and encouraged his reconciliation with the British.48  However, Saint-
Ange was unable to prevent the French habitants along the Mississippi or Wabash from 
conspiring with Pontiac and other chiefs suspicious of British intentions and offended by 
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the parsimony of their gifts as opposed to the old French government to thwart British 
efforts to establish a presence in the Illinois Country. 
Accordingly, General Jeffrey Amherst, Gage’s predecessor as commander-in-
chief of British forces in North America, addressed the problem with a new sense of 
urgency.49  Amherst considered several options -- evacuating the French villages to 
Canada in an inversion of sorts of the Acadian diaspora, or of forcing French colonists to 
migrate to a single village, presumably Kaskaskia or Vincennes.50  General Thomas 
Gage, overall commander of British forces in North America, based in New York, 
developed a scheme for the government of the Illinois Country, and another one, entitled 
“Invitation Serieuse aux Habitants des Illinois,” came directly from the French 
themselves.  It was a sign of the considerable natural progress in self-government made 
by the habitants over the course of their century-old relative isolation from Quebec or 
New Orleans that they would put such a document forward, although it was ultimately 
ignored.51  By default, government devolved to the British Army even after the Quebec 
Act moved responsibility for the Illinois Country from New York to Quebec City, since 
no British civil servants were available and no system of local governance could be 
agreed upon.  In the end, from the Conquest to the American Revolution, Canada and the 
Illinois Country were governed in the same fashion:  a military officer governing through 
a compliant council, mostly French in makeup, comprised of Quebec social elites and 
militia captains and judges based in Kaskaskia. 
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Despite such apparent neglect, the British felt an absent-minded responsibility for 
their “New Subjects.” Carleton’s predecessor at Quebec, Governor James Murray, had 
left the French secure in their practice of Catholicism, although he simultaneously 
promoted the “Test Act” that precluded Catholics from serving in government or on 
juries.52  Carleton, perceiving both the injustice and long-term impracticability of 
excluding nearly the entire Canadian population from a supposedly representative 
government, became a powerful advocate for French Canadians in London, making 
enemies of the “Old Subjects” in Canada, colonists south of Canada, and many in 
Parliament and Whitehall in the process.  He was also empathetic enough to understand 
why the concessions he won for the habitants in the Quebec Act, such as the continuance 
of French civil law and the tolerance of a Catholic bishop in an English province, earned 
so little gratitude from them, frustrating though he found the fact:  enough time had not 
elapsed between the adoption of the Act and the invasion of the Americans for the 
habitants to recognize its benefits.53  Cold and remote in manner, frequently high-handed 
and unabashedly paternalistic in his approach, Carleton’s reputation for fairness 
nevertheless gained support amongst the “New Subjects.”  “I shall tell it to General 
Carleton” became proverbial among the habitants of Canada.54 
Likewise, in the Illinois Country, even corrupt officers such as Wilkins attempted 
to show some degree of effectiveness.  Solicitude was, of course, self-interested; in a 
letter to Johnson, Gage related, “The Indians as well as the French are removing fast from 
the Ilinois to the new French Settlements on the opposite side of the Mississippi.  If this 
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Emigration continues, we shall have no method to support our new acquired settlement, 
but by leaving People there to settle on the deserted Lands; for it will not be possible to 
support our garrisons by sending them Provisions from Pensylvania or Mobile,”55   
Accordingly, with Gage’s permission, Wilkins established a civil court in Ste-Anne, the 
village just outside the walls of Fort de Chartres, to provide some form of civil 
government.  Although initially stacked with English merchants in an effort to ensure that 
their credit was repaid, in time this body came to resemble the community, with mostly 
French judges.  This court, along with a similar one set up at Cahokia, represented the 
highest form of law to the French in the Illinois Country, albeit one periodically 
suspended under both the British and, after Clark’s conquest, the Virginians when it 
became too inconvenient for the military authorities.56 
As in Quebec, the British made a significant concession to the French in that the 
proceedings of this court would take place in the French language.  In May 1770, a 
document was sent to Wilkins, at that time commandant at Kaskaskia, on behalf of 
George Wittmer, “merchant at Kaskaskia.”  The document was a complaint that the 
conduct of “the named Jodon” had resulted in 428 livres in peltries having been seized by 
“the Court of Judicature of the County,” and a request to be reimbursed by “sieur 
Crohan,” possibly George Croghan, for whom Jodon had presumably worked.  Kaskaskia 
native Daniel Blouin and Montreal merchant Dennis McCracken were named as parties 
in the suit.  Despite being written by an English merchant to the English commandant, the 
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entire document is written in French, presumably because it would be presented to the 
court at Kaskaskia.57 
However, the British, like the French before them, expected that their colonies, 
including the newly conquered ones, should provide some material benefit to them.  In 
the case of Canada, it was in every respect a captive market; the British controlled its 
ports, in which only British shipping was allowed.  Canada’s only overland markets were 
the British Atlantic colonies and the Illinois Country to the southwest.  On the other hand, 
the Illinois Country had other trading options due to its proximity to the Mississippi River 
and the Spanish settlements located there.  British authorities became worried about their 
French subjects trading with a potential imperial rival.  To ascertain the facts on the 
ground, Gage organized an expedition comprised of a pair of military engineers, Captain 
Harry Gordon and Ensign Thomas Hutchins, along with George Croghan and George 
Morgan; Morgan was a partner in the trading firm of Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 
who operated out of Kaskaskia.  Among the tasks assigned to Gordon and Hutchins was 
the evaluation of French and Indian trading patterns, and how to bend them to British 
interests.  Gordon’s report described one of the alternative markets, using the derogatory 
sobriquet of Pain Court (short of bread) for the town of St. Louis, as follows:  “The 
Village of Pain Court is pleasantly situated on a high ground, which forms the W. Bank 
of the Mississippi.”58  Speaking of Pierre Laclede, the founder and chief Indian trader of 
the village, Gordon said that he “takes so good measures, that the whole Trade of the 
Missouri, that of the Mississippi Northward, & that of the Nations near la Baye, 
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Michigan, & St. Joseph’s by the Ilinois River is entirely brought to him.  He appears to be 
sensible, clever, & will give us much trouble before We get the parts of this Trade which 
belong to Us out of their Hands.59 
Although Spanish merchants demanded higher prices for their wares, they offered 
French traders access to the lucrative New Orleans market. Speaking of St. Louis and 
“Misere,” a nickname for Ste Genevieve, Gordon explained: 
Our possession of the Ilinois is only useful at present in one 
Respect, It shows the Indian Nations our Superiority over the French, to 
whom they can thence perceive we give Law.  This is dearly bought by the 
Expense it is to Us, & the Inconvenience of supporting it.  The French 
carry on the Trade all round us by Land & by Water. 1st up the 
Mississippi, & to the Lakes by the Ouisconsing, Foxes, Chicagou, & 
Ilinois Rivers. 2dly Up the Ohio to the Wabash Indians, & even the small 
quantity of Skins or Furs that the Kaskasquias & Peioris (who are on our 
Side) get by hunting is carried under Our Nose to Misere and Pain Court.60  
To coerce the French into giving a larger share of their commerce to the British, 
Gordon recommended that “A Garrison at the Ilinois River & a Post at LaBaye, will 
partly prevent the first; and one at Massiac, as has been said, their Intercourse with the 
People on the Wabash . . . 61 
Upon receipt of Gordon’s journal, Gage forwarded it to Lord Shelburne, the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies in London, commenting in an accompanying letter 
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that “The Traders on the Branches of the Mississippi will never be tempted to bring their 
Peltry into the British Provinces whilst they get high prices for their Skins at New 
Orleans . . . nothing then but force can oblige our Traders to bring the produce of their 
Trade in those parts into our Provinces to be exported to Great Britain, or prevent foreign 
Traders from intruding upon the Territory belonging to His Majesty.”62   
Ultimately, Gordon’s recommendations were not enacted due to a lack of 
resources. The difficulty of incorporating the Illinois Country into the British mercantile 
system was one reason for the slowly encroaching neglect that took place between 
Captain Stirling’s arrival at Fort de Chartres in 1765 and Captain Lord’s departure with 
the last British regulars in 1776.  Another reason was the isolation enforced upon French 
villages along the Mississippi and the Wabash by the terms of the Royal Proclamation of 
1763, reinforced by the Quebec Act, which blocked colonial land speculation west of the 
Appalachians.  After the atrocities and the expense of the French and Indian War and 
Pontiac’s Rebellion, the British government was not anxious to be drawn into any further 
conflicts with Native Americans. In fact, British public opinion largely blamed land 
hungry English settlers for these conflicts.63  Accordingly, British officials quashed the 
promising British overland trade in the Illinois Country, begun in the waning stages of 
the French and Indian War, to the detriment of the Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan 
Company as well as individual speculators including George Washington.64   
While George Morgan remained heavily involved in Illinois affairs, hoping that 
the tide would turn, British investment in and emigration to the region were both 
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effectively nullified, to the satisfaction of royal governors and commanding officers as 
well as the government in London.  The Quebec Act codified and facilitated this 
prohibition by not only striking down all colonial land claims west of the Appalachians 
but gave the Canadian Governor control of the entire Illinois territory.  This infuriated 
inhabitants of the thirteen Atlantic British colonies, who branded the Quebec Act one of 
the “Intolerable Acts.”  As British interests in the region waned, so too did their efforts; 
by 1776 only fifty regulars remained, and these were finally withdrawn to assist with the 
defense of Canada.65 
By contrast, British interest in Canada, and the Canadians, increased over time.  
The experiences of Chevalier Gaspard-Joseph Chaussegros de Léry demonstrate how 
British attitudes toward at least the French elite changed as the occupation progressed.  In 
a letter to Carleton shortly after the general’s appointment as governor of Canada, Léry 
recalled that Carleton had expressed surprise at the chevalier’s intent to depart Quebec 
for France and had asked him to explain why.  Léry explained that Carleton’s predecessor 
Murray had insulted a young French officer who had come to inquire about an 
inheritance of Canadian property that he was to receive, insinuating that he was a spy.  
When Léry protested, Murray pointed out that Léry had his two children educated in 
France and was thus under suspicion himself, and declared that he had three days to 
either have someone from London vouch for him or to leave the colony.66  Although 
Murray later relented, attributing his hostility to “excitement,” presumably having been 
made overwrought by his difficulties in the province, and made known to Léry that it was 
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up to him whether or not to remain in Canada “where he was beloved,” he made a point 
of informing Léry that “maybe it would happen that arrangements from the Court of 
London that would not suit me, nor other Canadians, would soon arrive, and that in that 
case he would give me necessary time to sell my belongings if the arrangements were not 
to my taste.”67  Once Léry informed Murray of his decision to leave, the governor 
attempted to change his mind, but at that point Léry had been given ample reasons to 
doubt his continued welcome in Canada and to plan his return to France.68 
On September 24th, 1767, Carleton forwarded Léry’s letter to Lord Shelburne, 
Secretary of State for the colonies, with an accompanying letter of his own.  In it, he 
remarked that the services that Léry had already performed for the British, regardless of 
their efficacy, had “occasioned his being strongly marked by the French Ministers, and 
that the first Canadian gentleman, who attached himself to the King’s Interests, as soon as 
he became his Subject, should be obliged to quit his native country, together with his 
Distress, must affored them matter of Triumph.”69  After personally vouching for Léry’s 
character, he continued: 
Besides should His Majesty be graciously pleased to grant his 
Petition, it will serve as a Proof to the Gentlemen of Canada, that they are 
not forever to be excluded from the Service of their present Sovereign; this 
opinion I have endeavoured to remove, as I am thoroughly convinced, it is 
for the British Interests upon this Continent, they should be employed; 
From a Despair of this Sort, I imagine, it must have proceeded, that 
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several young Gentlemen, whose Parents remain in this Country, and 
whose Fortunes they must inherit, have entered into the French Service, as 
your Lordship may see, by the inclosed Return, the three first are Heirs of 
three of the best and richest Families in the Province.70 
The response to Carleton concerning Léry from the metropolitan government 
must have been favorable, for Léry did stay in Canada and held a number of offices under 
the British administration.  In a later letter to Shelburne, Carleton pointed out that of the 
seventy or so former French soldiers remaining in Quebec, none of them had entered the 
service of the British, and was unsparing as to why, writing that “we should only deceive 
ourselves by supposing, they would be active in the defence of a People, that has 
deprived them of their Honors, Privileges, Profits and Laws, and in their stead, have 
introduced much Expense, Chicannery, and confusion, with a Deluge of new Laws 
unknown and unpublished.  Therefore all circumstances considered, while Matters 
continue in their present State, the most we may hope for from the Gentlemen who 
remain in the Province, is passive neutrality on all occasions, with a respectful 
submission to Government, and Deference for the King’s Commission in whatever Hand 
it may be lodged..”71 
Carleton went on to explain that the French government, knowing that honor 
would compel Canadians who had remained to at least remain neutral in any future 
conflict between France and England, had been attempting to entice the seigneurs back to 
France.  If war broke out again, not only would the seigneurs have extensive knowledge 
of Canada, but they would easily be able to lead the habitants, who would overwhelm the 
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government and “Old Subjects” through sheer numbers.72  While the situation was 
precarious, Carleton had not given up on the Canadians; even while proposing 
fortifications to guard against a French incursion or insurrection, he held out the hope that 
“the Canadians could be interested to take a Part in the defence of the King’s 
government, a change not impossible to bring about.”73  The governor’s objective was to 
establish the seigneurs as a bastion against a possible French attack; as time progressed 
and the southern colonies became restive, this objective expanded to include an actual 
Continental invasion. 
Although Carleton believed that “the common People are greatly to be influenced 
by their Seigniors,” the habitants proved to be increasingly resistant to British 
influence.74  Under the French regime, a seigneur had an easy relationship with the 
habitants on his estate; the rents were low, and the corvée, or levy of labor demanded of 
the habitants on behalf of the seigneur, was light, and scrupulously scheduled so as not to 
interfere with the planting and harvest cycle.75  Eager to show their devotion to the new 
British suzerains, however, many seigneurs, particularly the younger members of the 
seigneurial class and those “Old Subjects” who had purchased seigneuries from those 
who had returned to France after the French and Indian War, attempted to form militia 
companies as the menace from the southern colonies became apparent.76  These attempts 
aroused the jealousies of the habitants; the calling up of the militia had historically been 
performed by its captains, not the seigneurs. Also, knowing that the seigneurs had largely 
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fallen into the orbit of the British, the habitants became concerned that their ultimate 
disposition might go beyond defending Canada from the Bastonnais and toward an 
invasion of the south, far away from their families and in support of a war in which they 
had no real stake.77  These tensions erupted in the spring and summer of 1775; the 
habitants refused to muster for the seigneurs, declaring that they would only respond to 
their own captains, who had been largely disregarded, or to British regular officers, who 
were in scarce supply in Canada at the time and were needed by their own units.78   
When the seigneurs attempted to assert their feudal privileges, the habitants 
threatened them with violence, unwilling to allow their relationship with the seigneurs to 
be unilaterally redefined and repelled by the idea that they would be required to choose 
sides in an internecine conflict between factions of a people whom they still feared and 
despised.79  Moreover, fearing that if other habitants were allowed to join the British, 
these would be used as justification for penalizing the habitants who remained neutral, 
those who wished to join the militia were forcibly restrained by those who did not.80  
Before the first American soldier entered Canada, the habitants were already in open 
conflict with the government and the seigneurs over the scope of their service. 
While the French merchants followed the lead of the seigneurs, British merchants 
in Montreal in hopes of prospering at the advent of the conversion of Canada to a colony 
similar to those of the Atlantic seaboard were outraged by the concessions of Murray and 
the greater ones of Carleton to the French.  Many of them, led by Montreal merchant 
Thomas Walker, were driven to extreme measures by the Quebec Act, which seemed to 
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foreclose any possibility of Protestant, Anglo-American control of Canada.  American 
Patriots stoked this anger and fear, arguing that Canada was a test case for Parliament to 
suppress all colonial legislatures and exert direct control over the colonies through royal 
or military governors.81  Throughout 1775, the Second Continental Congress as well as 
influential citizens of the Atlantic colonies urged sympathetic “Old Subjects” to form 
committees of correspondence and to coordinate strategy and planning with the southern 
colonies.82 
This proved difficult to accomplish, in large part because the French merchants 
almost to a man had been prevailed upon by the governor and the seigneurs to remain 
loyal or at least neutral. Canadians were likewise unwilling to join the Continental 
Association, a compact between the colonies to boycott British goods.83  Because the 
Gulf of St. Lawrence remained controlled by the Royal Navy, Canada was entirely 
dependent upon trade with the British.  Joining the Association would destroy the 
Canadian economy.  Canadian envoys to Congress repeatedly made the point that being 
released from the obligation to join the Association would greatly enhance the prospects 
of Canada aligning with the Atlantic colonies. However, Congress maintained that other 
colonies dependent upon shipping had joined the Association to their disadvantage.  It 
would be hard to explain to them why Canada should be an exception to the policy.84  As 
a result, formal committees of correspondence were never created in Canada, although ad 
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hoc efforts by sympathizers such as Walker continued, under the watchful but still 
inactive gaze of the governor at Quebec City.85 
In Canada, then, the situation on the eve of the American invasion was one in 
which the provincial elite but not necessarily the rural poor remained mostly loyal to 
British authorities.  The most vocal discontent was localized to the region around the 
town of Sorel and the southern bank of the St. Lawrence River west of Montreal. The 
proximity of this region to New York could not only facilitate the transportation of 
revolutionary ideas northward, but would almost certainly be the first area to be occupied 
by American forces given an invasion.86  This fact would prove to be invaluable to the 
Continental Army in the short term as it entered Canada. While few of the habitants 
joined the invasion force, they stood ready to provide supplies and other assistance, and 
they certainly did not take up arms on behalf of the government.   
However, as with most revolutionary movements, without leaders from the local 
elite to motivate and inspire them when reversals occurred and success became uncertain, 
the habitants became inclined to make decisions based on the risk to themselves instead 
of what they had to gain.  Once this occurred, the provincial elite, mainly the French 
bourgeoisie, were able to highlight the difficulties experienced when aiding the invaders, 
the likelihood of government reprisal if the invasion failed, and the promise of mercy in 
exchange for repentance.87 
In the Illinois Country, on the other hand, the seigneurs were a distant memory, 
and few of the powerful merchants remained to serve as intermediaries.  With the 
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approach of the British, about one-third of the French inhabitants of the east bank of the 
Mississippi had removed to the western side, controlled by the Spanish.88  The primary 
reason for doing so was that the French historical experience with the British had for the 
past two hundred years been one of fanatical intolerance of the Catholic faith.  They had 
no reason to expect that the current incoming British overlords would pursue any 
different policy.  On the other hand, the west bank was now controlled by “His Most 
Catholic Majesty,” Charles III of Spain, who additionally was a cousin of the still fondly-
remembered Louis XV.  Even though Captain Stirling and his successors would maintain 
the tolerance that they promised, there was a level of certainty concerning the Spanish 
that could never be reached by the Protestant British. 
However, there was a second, more temporal concern.  The Methodist movement 
in Britain had made major strides in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Prominent 
Methodists such as founder John Wesley and politician William Wilberforce had moved 
the British electorate decisively against the institution of slavery and in favor of its 
abolition.  The wealthier and better-educated merchants of the pays des Illinois, with their 
business and familial connections to Canada, would have been aware of this, and by 
extension so would the habitants.   
Slavery was a commonplace institution among the French in Illinois, although not 
nearly as widespread as among the French in Lower Louisiana or the Caribbean or the 
English in the southern colonies of the Atlantic seaboard.  Merchants and wealthier 
habitants might own five slaves or less to help with household tasks or those related to 
the fur trade, although there were one or two exceptions that might own up to 65.  
                                                 




Habitants of lesser means might own one, with whom they would toil in the common 
fields.89  Again, the British protested that they had no intention of interfering with slavery 
as they had found it on their arrival in the Illinois Country, but many of the French, 
especially the more affluent, decided to take advantage of the known quantity on the 
other side of the river.90  Spain had no issue with African slaves; there was a prohibition 
against Native American slaves, called panis by the French due to their early encounters 
with the Osage selling Pawnee captives, but after 1763 the number of panis had 
decreased among the French in general as those who died or were manumitted were not 
replaced, and those that remained could be overlooked by the mostly French 
administrators employed by the Spanish.91 
Finally, the Spanish were aggressive in courting Illinois French support. Both 
Spanish and British officials knew that if the habitant population on the British side were 
greatly reduced, it would become difficult for the British to sustain garrisons without the 
foodstuffs and other goods supplied by the community.  Moreover, the primary value of 
Upper Louisiana to the Spanish was as a buffer to protect against British incursions. 
However, such a buffer would be of limited value if it were underpopulated, and the 
Spanish had no means to substantially populate it themselves.  A large population of 
loyal French habitants might provide the protection sought by Spain. 
Accordingly, the Spanish commandants at St. Louis offered generous parcels of 
land to potential settlers.92  Along with choice land parcels came the ability to freely 
move goods through the Spanish port of New Orleans. When Spanish officials 
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occasionally closed the port, the habitants and merchants of the British side would have 
to employ middlemen in St. Louis and Ste. Genevieve in order to gain access to those 
markets.  Finally, the inhabitants of British Illinois could be assured of a system of 
governance with which they were intimately familiar.  Although there was a Spanish 
lieutenant-governor in St. Louis and commandant at Ste. Genevieve, these were inclined 
to rule with a very light hand, and to allow the most influential French – Louis de Saint-
Ange in St. Louis and Francois Vallé in Ste. Genevieve – to handle the daily affairs of the 
community.93  Especially as successive British commandants showed wildly varying 
degrees of competence and honesty, this continuity was highly appealing to the 
fundamentally conservative French population. 
The departure of the French social elite that could have served as intermediaries 
between the British and the traders and habitants was especially significant because as 
with Canada, there was a small group of British traders that had migrated to the pays des 
Illinois that had not left after the Royal Proclamation of 1763 prohibited land speculation.  
George Morgan was one of these, but he had decided to settle into the community, be 
helpful to the British, and bide his time, at least until he entered into a dispute with 
Wilkins and left the region in 1770.94  Others, much like Thomas Walker in Montreal, 
were not so patient.  On March 31, 1777, a trader named Daniel Murray, acting as agent 
for another merchant named Thomas Bentley, addressed a letter to Carleton which 
detailed numerous complaints against Rocheblave.  Among these were that “we your 
Humble Petitioners, and his Majesty’s most Faithful Subjects find to our bitter Grief our 
Liberties Trampled upon and Justice in all cases Refused us, and when we presume to 
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argue on Such injustice, the Said De Rocheblave cuts the mater Short by Informing us 
that Such is the Laws in France which he orders us to Follow.”95  Murray went on to 
accuse Rocheblave of “daily imposing upon us by denying us the Justice which by law 
and Equity we have a right to Demand at his hands both for the Security of our Property 
as well as our Persons, neither of which we look upon to be safe under our Government 
as Englishmen and English Laws are to our very great Mortification dispised by the 
public in General and apears to be so by him the said Rocheblave in particular.”96  Much 
as with the similar complaints made by Walker and the other English merchants in 
Montreal, Carleton was disinclined to take the side of the “Old Subjects.” There is no 
indication that he replied to the letter, and shortly afterward Bentley was arrested by 
order of Hamilton in Detroit upon being accused by Rocheblave of conspiring with the 
Americans.97 
As in Canada, the embittered English merchants were susceptible to the allure of a 
government that would be truly “English” and representative in nature, and not privilege 
the French over them.  While Rocheblave could not prove conclusively that Bentley had 
conspired with Continental agents, the evidence strongly suggested that he had met with a 
Virginian trader named Benjamin Linn.  A true opportunist, Linn had reconnoitered the 
Illinois Country for months and used this information to secure a place in Clark’s 1775 
expedition.  In a letter to Haldimand in 1780 written from Williamsburg after his capture, 
Rocheblave lamented, “It is his [Bentley’s] cabal and that of the Spaniards that led the 
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Americans to the Mississippi.”98  The Spanish “cabal” had effected its plans in part by 
luring the British commandant’s allies opposed to Bentley’s group away from British 
Illinois; as will be seen, the Spanish government in St. Louis and New Orleans would 
become more directly involved.  In the meantime, in both Canada and the Illinois 
Country, a French population still wary of its British rulers and a small nucleus of anti-
Ministerial British merchants awaited the approach of the Americans. 
In sum, Canada and the pays des Illinois were in very similar circumstances 
between the end of the French and Indian War and the beginning of the American 
Revolution, which is not surprising since in cultural, if not political respects, they were in 
many ways two different regions of the same country.  Both societies struggled with the 
effects of occupation, and with trying to determine the best way to respond to an ancient 
enemy making some startling new overtures.  In Canada, the French “New Subjects” had 
little choice but to guardedly trust their new masters and see what developed, for short of 
returning to France, which by then would have been nearly as alien to them as was 
British governance, they had nowhere else to go.  In the Illinois Country, on the other 
hand, the French always had an option in the form of a friendly neighboring power just 
on the other side of the Mississippi, and soon would be presented with an unlooked-for 
alternative to British rule in their homeland as well.
                                                 







Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, any conflict between 
England and France was certain to involve a powerful religious subtext.  Since the 
English break with Rome and the establishment of the Protestant Church of England in 
1520, the French and Spanish crowns posed as champions of the Catholic Faith against 
the English heretics.  In turn, the English were unremittingly hostile to the “papists” of 
the Bourbon monarchy, which encompassed both France and Spain since the end of the 
War of the Spanish Succession in 1714.  This aspect of the British-French rivalry only 
intensified in North America. The Puritans had settled New England largely because the 
Anglican Church itself had proven to be too “Romish” for them.  The radical Calvinism 
of the New Englanders clashed sharply with the reactionary Catholicism of the French 
Canadians, which would have seemed backward and medieval even to their countrymen 
currently experiencing the Enlightenment in France, with frequent and vicious combat 
between the two as a result.  At the conclusion of the French and Indian War, 
consequently, the French in Canada and in Illinois fully expected occupying British 
officials to suppress their religion if not outright expel them, as had been the fate of their 
Acadian brethren earlier in the war.  Although they were mistaken in these assumptions, 
it took some time for the British to even partially allay such suspicions.99 
As the American Revolution grew closer, Enlightenment ideals of tolerance were 
frequently at war with the long-habituated suspicion of Catholicism endemic among the 
Continentals.  This suspicion was whipped into white-hot rage by the passage of the 
                                                 




Quebec Act in 1774, which granted religious freedom to Catholics in Canada and 
sanctioned the selection of a bishop in Quebec.  This, combined with the establishment of 
a colonial government for Canada with a royal governor and a council but without any 
kind of elected legislature, convinced the Atlantic colonists that a despotic union of 
Church and State was coming to fruition in Canada that could be used to suppress any 
Continental effort to defend their liberties, and possibly even as a model that the Ministry 
could apply to the southern colonies.100 
As an example of the volatile nature of religious relations in the Atlantic colonies, 
the colony of Maryland had been founded by Cecilius Calvert, second Lord Baltimore, as 
a refuge for Catholics. The first Attorney General of Maryland was Charles Carroll, 
grandfather of Charles Carroll of Carrollton, the only Catholic signer of the Declaration 
of Independence, who would later play a substantial role in the Continental occupation of 
Canada.101  However, in 1688, the very year that Carroll arrived in Maryland, Baltimore’s 
patron, James II, was overthrown by his Protestant daughter Mary and her husband, 
William of Orange, in the Glorious Revolution.  Shortly afterward, Baltimore’s brother, 
who ruled in his stead, was overthrown by Protestant partisans, and Carroll was briefly 
imprisoned.102  As a result, by the time of Carroll of Carrollton, the former Catholic haven 
was dominated by a Protestant legislature that had made Anglicanism its official religion 
and passed legislation barring Catholics from holding office and outlawing the Catholic 
education of children.  This forced him to seek his education in Paris, although enrolling 
in Catholic schools in Europe was also forbidden.103  Nonetheless, Carroll quickly 
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declared for the Continental cause upon hearing of the siege of Boston in 1775, even 
though he and his fellow Catholics had suffered indignities under the colonists, and the 
Quebec Act might have given him reason to hope for better under direct British rule.104  
His entry into public life had been to take the side of the Maryland House of Burgesses 
against the royal governor in the matter of the schedule of fees due to provincial officials; 
the legislature had voted to lower the fees upon their renewal, but Governor Eden had 
prorogued it and declared that the current schedule would be maintained.  Carroll 
engaged in a public debate through the newspapers with Daniel Dulany, the Provincial 
Secretary, who did not scruple to invoke anti-Catholic prejudice in his attacks on 
Carroll.105  However, public opinion held Carroll to be the victor, and his engagement in 
this issue went far toward informing his views and actions concerning the controversy in 
Boston.106 
If the Atlantic colonists were outraged by the concessions made to Catholics by 
the Quebec Act, the “Old Subjects” in Canada itself were even more so.  It was they who 
stood to lose what they had come to regard as English liberties and were in danger of 
becoming a religious minority in a country that they had come to see as their own.   The 
transplants from the southern colonies were particularly angered that the Test Act that 
might have excluded the French Catholic “New Subjects” from any part of the 
governance of the colony and given mastery of it to them was evaded and eventually 
ignored.107  Their anger found an outlet in late 1774, when they defaced a statue of 
George III in Montreal by placing a miter and rosary of potatoes on it and writing the 
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words “Voilá le Pape de Canada et le sot Anglais” – “Behold the Pope of Canada and the 
English Fool.”108  Despite blandishments and threats, no one would admit to having done 
it, but Carleton and his council were well aware that the French had no reason to attack 
the English king, and moreover would not have offered insult to the Pope.109 
In the fall of 1774, Congress sent open letters to the people of Canada and of 
Great Britain to lay out their grievances against the British government.  One such 
pamphlet was printed in French by Continental sympathizer Fleury Mesplet, and 
eventually included in its entirety by Canadian notary and loyalist Simon Sanguinet in his 
eyewitness account of the American invasion.  Congress began by paying tribute to the 
“courageous and glorious resistance” that the French had displayed during the French and 
Indian War, and declared that “as bravery and greatness of soul are naturally conjoined, 
we expected that our courageous enemies would become our sincere friends [translation 
author’s].”110  After repeatedly citing the baron de Montesquieu in support of a divided 
government and natural rights, the letter went on to address religious issues,  “But what 
are you offered in their place by the last act of Parliament?” railed the pamphlet.  
“Liberty of conscience for your religion:  no, God gave you that, and the temporal 
Powers with whom you were and are engaged, have strongly stated that you would have 
full enjoyment of it:  if divine and human laws could safeguard that liberty from the 
despotic whims of the wicked, it was already aroused.”111  Later, Congress remonstrated 
with the Canadians: 
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We know too well the nobility of feeling that distinguishes your 
nation, to think that you would refrain from forming friendly relationships 
with us due to prejudices to which a difference of religion might give 
birth.  You know that liberty is of a nature so excellent that it renders all 
who attach themselves to it above all of these petty weaknesses.  You have 
very convincing proof of these truths in the example of the Swiss cantons, 
which although they are made up of Catholic and Protestant states, live 
together in peace and in good reason.112   
In this address, Congress expressed its willingness to work to form a multicultural, 
interdenominational union, respecting the Catholicism of its northernmost prospective 
member. 
However, the letter of Congress to the king’s subjects in Britain displayed a 
somewhat darker attitude toward Catholicism.  In that letter, Congress inveighed against 
the Quebec Act as having “recognized the Catholic religion . . . and, ignoring the 
antagonistic faith of the old colonies, their laws and government, set up civil and spiritual 
tyranny in Canada, to the great danger of the neighboring provinces.”113  Driving the 
point home, the letter continued, “Nor can we express our astonishment that a British 
parliament should ever consent to establish in that colony a religion that often drenched 
your island in blood, and has disseminated impiety, bigotry, persecution, murder, and 
rebellion, through every part of the world.”114  In this letter, it was clear that the Atlantic 
colonists had not softened as much toward Catholicism as had been represented to the 
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Canadians, although the historians François-Xavier Garneau and Mark Anderson concur 
that the contrasting tones of the two letters probably reflect the awareness of Congress 
concerning the attitudes of their respective audiences at least as much as any overt 
prejudice.  Nevertheless, both historians also agree that it was naïve of Congress to 
assume that the letter to Britain would not be published in Canada; the British 
government in London and Quebec made a point of doing so, and of highlighting the 
vitriolic tone with which Congress referred to the Catholic faith.  Garneau and Sanguinet 
agree that the fumbling duplicity of Congress in this instance was a critical blow to later 
American efforts to ingratiate themselves to the Canadians during the invasion, although 
Anderson is skeptical of the ultimate impact. 
While the English and French colonists engaged in the perennial battle of 
Protestants against Catholics, the Catholic Church itself was experiencing turmoil in 
Canada.  Although the British allowed Briand’s predecessor, Henri-Marie Dubreil de 
Pontbriand, to continue on in his post after the occupation of Quebec, upon his death it 
was by no means certain that a successor would be allowed to assume office. In fact, 
Canada was without a bishop for nearly six years before Briand ascended to the bishop’s 
seat.  During that time, a small but vibrant strain of Jansenism, a variety of Catholic 
theology and practice that resembled Calvinism and that had existed in the Canadian 
Church since shortly after its inception, became popular amongst French Catholic church 
officials.115  While the Church in Canada remained powerfully ultramontane, many 
Canadians began to wonder if a bishop in Quebec was necessary.  For instance, Thomas 
Maseres, the Attorney-General of Quebec, embarked on a project in the 1850s to 
                                                 





assimilate the French Canadians into British culture and the Church of England.  He 
interviewed various priests to determine the strength of their opposition and discovered 
that many of them would have been happy to have remained with a vicar-general 
nominated by a synod of the Canadian clergy, with the synod having overall control of 
the Canadian Church.116  This idea had been proposed by Rome in 1765 as a counter to a 
scheme of the Canadian Church and the British government to elect a bishop, which 
Rome would not allow.  The plan had found some adherents among those of the clergy 
not anxious to find themselves again under the potentially heavy hand of a bishop.117 
As the Continental invasion approached, Briand discovered that this spirit had not 
departed.  In a 1775 letter to a priest in the parish of St-Thomas, Briand lamented: 
This is the religion that we profess, and the religion of their fathers 
that they have preserved and transmitted to them until now, but their 
children will not keep it for long, if they have not lost it already, because I 
judge and I will argue against my own interest that their conduct at least is 
truly heretical, and they are truly imbued with the heresy of the Bastonnais 
Presbyterians who deny the ecclesiastical hierarchy.118 
The traditional deference to the bishop among both the clergy and the laity had 
frayed considerably under the British, particularly in the six years that had elapsed 
between Pontbriand and Briand.  Ironically, this came despite the efforts of the British 
themselves, who realized that the dignity of the episcopal see would be useful in 
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constructing a working relationship between the State and the Church, even at the risk of 
tolerating a certain amount of “popery.”119 
A general attitude of defiance among many of the habitants was in evidence as 
early as 1768, just two years after Briand had become bishop.  With the cessation of 
incoming priests from France, the supply in Canada had become tight, and Briand was 
forced to consolidate parishes.  One of the parishes on the Île-Jésus just north of 
Montreal, Sainte Rose de Lima, had been informed by the bishop that they were to merge 
with the parish of Saint Vincent de Paul. Sainte Rose parishioners had in turn strongly 
objected, declaring that they would refuse to accept his orders to abandon their beloved 
church.  Briand’s response betrayed his shock: “I was surprised, my very dear children, 
by your request; it contains an explicit disobedience.  You have accused me of injustice 
and prejudice.  I cannot believe that you believe these sentiments of me, and when, 
against my inclination, I accepted the heavy burden of the episcopate, I never imagined 
that I would encounter such intransigence in the Canadian people.”120  He went on to 
explain why he had made his decision, but even in doing so, he expressed his incredulity:  
“I am not obliged to give you my reasons due to this imperious imputation.”121  When the 
parish refused to unite with St-Vincent de Paul, Briand struck back with an interdict, 
angrily writing, “I no longer consider them Christians.  Do not talk to me about it 
anymore.  Let them follow their evil feelings, let them do what they want; I no longer 
regard them as being of my flock.”122  He soon thought better of the interdict, sending the 
                                                 
119 Neatby, 109. 
120 Jean-Olivier Briand to habitants of Ste-Rose, September 26, 1768, Copies de Lettres, 3:468, Archives de 
l’Archdiocése de Québec, Quebec, QC. 
121 Ibid. 




cure of Ste-Rose a letter the next day venting his hostility at one particularly recalcitrant 
parishioner.  However, Briand still fulminated over the slight, making an interesting 
remark in light of how he would be perceived later:  “It will not do that they think that 
English liberty permits them to do anything or to disobey.”123 
The declining respect shown toward the clergy, and in particular the bishop, was 
accelerated by the perception that they were acting as agents of Carleton and his masters 
in London.  In the above referenced letter to Curtable at St-Thomas, Briand complained, 
“My authority is no more respected than yours:  they say of me, as of you, that I am 
English.”124  Briand strongly defended himself against this charge, telling Curtable, “I am 
in effect English, you must be, they must be too, since they have sworn it and all natural, 
divine, and human laws command it.  But not I, nor you, nor they must be of the English 
religion.”125  Briand expounded on this theme in a letter to the cure at the parish of St-
Michel, where a parishioner had called out in the middle of celebrating a feast day that 
“there had been preaching for the English for too long”: 
Father LeFranc conformed to natural religion and to the doctrine of 
our Savior and of his apostle St. Paul, the Doctor of the Nations, who 
taught due obedience to temporal powers.  [The parishioner] has not only 
been deficient with regard to his king, his oath, and proper subordination, 
but also in the respect due to the temple of the Lord where no layman 
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ought to speak, the respect due to the Word of God, and to the ministers 
whom he has anointed.126 
After threatening the parish with an interdict suspending all liturgical and pastoral 
tasks within its borders if the malefactor was not identified to the priest, Briand went on, 
“They say that the priests preach war; no, that is not what I preach, but rather obedience 
and subordination, and fidelity to oaths and to their king to whom they promised this . . . I 
reproach them only for their ingratitude and their small amount of recognition.”127 
In Canada, then, the Americans invaded as the clergy and the Canadian laity were 
redefining their relationship with one another.  The shock of the conquest combined with 
the long absence of a dominant Catholic leader had allowed the habitants to develop a 
skeptical attitude toward the bishop and priests, although they remained fervently 
Catholic and the threat of interdict of regions or excommunication of persons still 
weighed heavily upon them.  Even some of the clergy had been infected by ideas of 
rational inquiry and personal freedom of conscience that penetrated Canada from abroad, 
whether from Enlightenment France or even Protestant New England as commercial and 
political ties slowly developed.  During the Continental invasion, these fractures would 
prove to be of more consequence than would the classic rivalry between the Québecois 
Catholics and New England Puritans. 
In the Illinois Country, on the other hand, the first shock of religious change had 
very little to do with the British:  it came with the suppression of the Jesuit order in 1763.  
Even though it had become apparent that the region would be given to the British in the 
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Treaty of Paris, the French government ordered its governor in Louisiana to not only 
execute the suppression in New Orleans prior to its occupation by the British, but to make 
sure that it was done in the pays des Illinois as well.  From nearly the beginning of 
French occupation of the Illinois Country, an arrangement had existed wherein the Jesuits 
were responsible for religious instruction throughout most of the region, including 
Kaskaskia and Vincennes, but that the Seminary of Foreign Missions in Quebec would be 
responsible for Cahokia.  However, on September 24, 1763, Pierre-Joseph Neyons de 
Villiers, the last commandant of Fort de Chartres under the Bourbon monarchy, ordered 
the Jesuits bound over for banishment and their property sold, a process that was 
apparently executed with considerable severity.128 
As a result, the villages served by the Jesuits were left without any priests as the 
Society was forcibly removed, but in addition, the Seminarian at Cahokia, Jacques-
Francois Forget Duverger, decided to depart as well, leaving the entire pays des Illinois 
momentarily without priests.129  When the Jesuits reached New Orleans on their way back 
to France, however, Sebastien Meurin requested permission to return to Kaskaskia, even 
though he would be without any sort of support and entirely dependent upon the 
community.  The Superior Council at New Orleans allowed him to return, but given that 
New Orleans was now technically Spanish, Meurin not only lost his Jesuit identity, as 
Spain had also suppressed the Jesuits, but could only take up residence on the Spanish 
side of the Mississippi, at Ste. Genevieve.  Moreover, he was separated from the diocese 
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of Quebec, being required to report to the head of the Capuchin monastery at New 
Orleans.130 
At this time, Meurin was approaching sixty and in ill health due to his lengthy 
travails in the Illinois Country, having served among the Natives in the then-malarial 
climate since 1742.  He was required to live in Ste. Genevieve, but the bulk of his 
ministry was on the British side of the river, in the French villages and among the Native 
American tribes, forcing him to make innumerable river crossings at a time when ferries 
were a rough and dangerous mode of travel.  In the course of his travels in British 
Illinois, he frequently had trouble with supplies; the French on the eastern bank of the 
Mississippi and the Wabash often evaded their obligations by claiming that they had no 
duty to support a “Spanish” priest.131 
Meurin had been a favorite of Briand, who was not overly sympathetic to the 
suppression of the Jesuits.  When the papacy finally followed the lead of the great 
Catholic powers and issued its own ban on the order, Briand had no choice but to follow 
suit.  However, he promptly formed another order under his own jurisdiction, using the 
same mode of dress and employing Loyola’s Spiritual Exercises, and inviting the Jesuits 
in Quebec to join.132  As the formal orders to dissolve the order came while Carleton was 
in England, he felt obligated to explain his actions to lieutenant governor Hector-
Théophile Cramahé, who approved wholeheartedly.  Remarkably, Briand was able to 
suppress the papal bulls of dissolution and sponsor his own quasi-Jesuit order without 
attracting the notice of Rome.133  When, shortly after assuming office, Briand learned that 
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Meurin had returned to the Illinois Country, he responded immediately [translation 
author’s]: 
I cannot express to you enough the joy I felt to learn by Jaunay that 
a Jesuit had been restored to the unhappy countries of the Illinois and the 
Mississippi.  Since Providence without regard to my unworthiness has 
charged me with the heavy and formidable burden of the episcopate of 
Quebec, I have been terribly worried about the poor Christians of your 
districts . . . Yes, your presence in those places  
fills me with consolation because I hope that you would like to 
care for those abandoned people.  A thousand times I bless our Lord that 
inspired in the English goodness and veneration for you, and to authorize 
your ministry.134 
In the same letter, Briand appointed Meurin vicar-general for the western region 
of British North America, which eased the burden of ministering to the Mississippi 
villages in the short term but caused its own issues.135  Meurin’s new jurisdiction was 
geographically immense, a problem that Briand acknowledged in his letter.  As events 
would show, the care of such a territory would be draining even for a much younger, 
healthier man.136  Moreover, Rocheblave, who at the time was the Spanish commandant 
at Ste. Genevieve, took umbrage at Meurin’s departure; he denounced the old priest as a 
British spy and ordered his arrest, from which Meurin narrowly escaped. 
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Meurin continually implored Briand for more priests, but Briand was already 
facing unrest in Canada due to not having enough priests to man the existing parishes; 
while Meurin wanted four priests, Briand finally sent one.  The priest, Pierre Gibault, was 
a young man recently out of seminary, who had spent some time in his youth travelling 
the pays d’en haut to the north of the pays des Illinois, and who might have been 
involved in some engagements in the French and Indian War.137  In a letter to Etienne 
Marchand, the former vicar-general of Quebec, Briand reported his decision [translation 
author’s]: 
I am sending M. Gibault to the Illinois, he is well-resolved to 
undertake this good work.  I have spoken with M. Meurin, because he 
wants a leader there, to whom I could give all of his powers, and I truly 
believe that [Gibault] is one of the most capable men in the Diocese.  He 
has spirit, moderation, and a fear of God.  I know of no fault in him, 
because the idle talk that does not become him is not inherent in him, and 
by ingratiating himself and adapting to circumstances, he will avoid it.138 
Gibault left for the Illinois Country in June of 1768, with his mother and sister in 
tow; his sister would later marry Timothé de Montbrun, who would later serve for a time 
as a Virginian lieutenant-governor of Kaskaskia.139 
Briand did not send Gibault to the region lightly, as can be seen by his mention of 
“idle talk.”  In his letter to Meurin announcing Gibault’s arrival, he expressed repeated 
concerns about whether the younger priest would fulfill all of the bishop’s expectations, 
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and in his lengthy letter to Gibault just prior to his departure, Briand loaded him down 
with advice and repeatedly directed him to follow Meurin’s guidance.140  Part of this 
caution would be only natural, as Gibault had been one of the first graduates of the 
seminary since the Conquest and his course of study had been truncated at two years; 
moreover, the region would be new to him, while Meurin had been there for over twenty 
years.141  However, the frankly dismissive tone with which Gibault described Meurin, 
combined with the plaintive nature of his correspondence with Briand, made it clear that 
Gibault was a young man in a hurry.  Gibault told Briand that Meurin had entered a 
“second infancy” and that his sternness with the villagers had considerably alienated 
them, an attack against which Briand pushed back: 
You must think twice before going against the advice of Father 
Meurin in defiance of your instructions; his way of writing and reporting 
does not indicate a man having returned to childhood.  We must not allow 
ourselves to be prejudiced or shocked by men that are only a little 
Christian, as you have done with me in times past and continue to do.  It is 
never good to give into harshness, but this name is often given to firmness; 
softness that abandons the interests of God is treated as prudence, but it is 
only a prudence to the flesh, the enemy of God, says St. Paul – follow my 
advice and keep to the middle.  Father Meurin has two virtues that are 
offended by the vice of avarice; he is defended by the qualities of a man 
and of one having taken vows.  I fear that the reports that you have 
                                                 





received are based on the impious sentiments engendered among 
Christians by their enemies.142 
Briand was not likely to forget that Meurin had placed himself in considerable 
discomfort and risk to minister to the forsaken French and Native villages in Illinois and 
was certainly not going to be pushed into hasty action by a neophyte priest. 
Gibault established himself in Kaskaskia and threw himself energetically into his 
new assignment.  For all of his rancor toward Meurin, the older priest did not interfere 
with Gibault, preferring to live in a state of semi-retirement at the village of Prairie du 
Rocher, just north of Kaskaskia.143  As late as 1772, Gibault still complained to Briand 
about Meurin, stating in the course of lamenting that “you do not yet grant a priest to the 
Cahokias; at least one of us could take care of the Illinois on the interior, but only I go 
out, because once more it is believed that Father Meurin is dead, at least everyone except 
for his small village, of which half come to me.  More and more infirm, he is not useful to 
me,” although he did concede that “all in God speak of his good example and his 
respectable age.”144 Gibault had reason to complain, for now he was responsible for the 
vast territory assigned to Meurin.  Indeed, his already substantial burden was increased 
by the fact that he had reconciled with Rocheblave in Ste. Genevieve, who in turn 
interceded with Pedro Piernas, the Spanish lieutenant-governor in St. Louis.  Now, 
Gibault was forced to perform services on both sides of the Mississippi.145  Beyond even 
this increased responsibility, Gibault was approached by British commandant John 
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Wilkins shortly after his arrival in 1768 to minister to Irish troops who had recently been 
placed under English command at Kaskaskia.  Although the death rate among the Irish in 
the alien Midwestern climate kept Gibault busy with administering extreme unction, a 
benefit was that performing this service made him indispensable to Wilkins and the 
succeeding commandants, which resulted in him being treated by the British with a 
benign neglect.146   
Through all of Gibault’s travails, Briand’s primary concern was to prompt the 
younger priest to visit parishioners among the Natives and at Vincennes on the Wabash.  
Typical was the exhortation in a 1770 letter to Gibault: “If it were possible to make an 
apostolic excursion to Post Vincennes, you could make a great harvest there:  if there 
were only one of the elect there, he deserves this approach from you, and the people of 
your post should lend themselves to it with joy and sacrifice everything, for the Lord their 
Father would hold nothing back from his children.”147  Accordingly, Gibault made four 
extensive tours of the Illinois Country between his arrival in 1768-1775, moving among 
the Indian villages, Vincennes, and as far north as Michilimackinac, braving danger from 
the elements and potentially hostile Native Americans, by whom he was held three times 
by the year 1772.148 
Further, Briand’s letters to Gibault reveal politeness but also a sense of 
trepidation.  One letter began, “I always receive, my dear Gibault, with a new tenderness 
of the heart the letters that you write me.”  Yet Briand also admitted to being concerned 
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with Gibault’s  “idle talk” and had asked Meurin to keep a close eye on him.149  Likewise 
in a letter that began, “Your letter, my dear Gibault, pulled me away from worry and 
caused me untold joy,” Briand shortly afterward went on to complain:  “It is after these 
considerations that I had a real sadness of the soul upon learning at Montreal in the 
course of my visits that you had left with your mother and one of your sisters or parents.  
You should not have done so without consulting me or my grand-vicar (Etienne 
Montgolfier of Montreal); perhaps, if you had told me about your plan, I would not have 
sent you in the place of another priest that wanted to go.”150  Gibault apparently 
responded hotly to this, for in a subsequent letter Briand admonished his colleague, “You 
have not taken the sense of the reproaches that I made to you on the subject of your 
mother and your sister; I was not angry that they went with you, nor am I that they stay 
there.”151  Misunderstandings and slights like these continued throughout Briand’s and 
Gibault’s correspondence. 
Finally, in a letter dated October 5, 1775, Gibault let his superior know that he 
had reached his limit: 
 But now my body is weakened by those sufferings and I can no 
longer accomplish what both you and I would wish.  I am now forty years 
old.  Never sparing myself, I have often had poor food and frequently 
went hungry, traveling on foot day and night, exposed to all sorts of 
weather and in every season.  Worst of all is the mental anxiety, being a 
stranger in a country of libertines, exposed to all the calumnies which the 
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irreligious and impious could invent, having my every action, even the 
most well-intentioned, misinterpreted and misrepresented to you . . . For 
all of these and other reasons, I ask you to let me leave the Illinois.”152 
Briand responded by contacting Meurin to ask about the situation. Meurin replied 
with a litany of complaints about Gibault compiled from the habitants and about which 
he claimed to have had no prior knowledge. Such charges included Gibault playing at 
sports with the younger men, inciting jealousies among the women, and staying up late 
drinking and playing cards.  Moreover, Meurin reported that Gibault had soured on the 
habitants in general, complaining to Meurin about them and constantly stating his desire 
to leave.153  Before Briand could take any action, Meurin died on February 23, 1777.154 
As a result of Meurin’s death, Gibault was left as Briand’s vicar-general in the 
west, and the only priest in British Illinois.  He had been under a cloud since his 
departure from Canada ten years previous.  Briand’s reference to “idle talk” was thought 
by his biographer Donnelly to refer to gossip, but this would be an odd thing on which 
the bishop might obsess.  It seems more likely that Gibault, a young man caught up in the 
relatively metropolitan environment of Quebec, may have expressed some sympathy for 
the anti-episcopal opinions swirling around the Canadian capital at that time.  Certainly, 
the entirety of his career, from its beginning under Briand through the American 
occupation of Kaskaskia and beyond, indicates a tendency to push back against clerical 
authority.  However, there is no concomitant record of any similar tendency to fight civil 
authority, other than litigating the case of the Seminary of Foreign Missions regarding the 
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church in Cahokia that Father Forget Duverger had abandoned.  While the accusations of 
drinking and card-playing suggest that he was hardly an observant Jansenist, it seems that 
he may have acquired some of their sentiments concerning the episcopal hierarchy, which 
would only have been strengthened by the natural desire of a younger man to escape the 
confines of his elders’ guidance. 
Interestingly, one early success enjoyed by Gibault was his reconciliation with 
Rocheblave at Ste. Genevieve, and subsequently Piernas in St. Louis.  There was no 
reason on the surface why Gibault could accomplish this while Meurin could not; Gibault 
was a diocesan priest under the bishop of Quebec, exactly as Meurin was.  Donnelly 
speculates that Rocheblave’s change of heart was brought about by the birth of his son, 
and the consequent necessity of finding a priest to baptize the boy.155  While this might 
explain Rocheblave’s concession, it would hardly explain that of Piernas, who would 
have had to have concurred with Rocheblave’s initial decision to treat Meurin as a spy.  
A more likely explanation is that it was known by everyone that Meurin enjoyed the 
confidence of Briand and would almost certainly never do anything against the bishop’s 
interests, or by extension those of England.  If Rocheblave and Piernas, on the other 
hand, had reason to believe that Gibault might not be so attached to Briand, it might have 
been in their best interests to accommodate the young priest.  Having someone who 
would at least listen to Spanish entreaties might be useful to Spain, or in the event, 
possibly her Continental allies. 
Canada’s clergy was split by ecclesiastical politics and doctrinal issues in the 
years between the Conquest and the American invasion, but the promise of British 
                                                 




tolerance against the history of sectarian conflict with New England and the ambiguity of 
Continental declarations led them to almost entirely unite with their bishop.  In the 
Illinois Country, on the other hand, the clerical situation was far more dependent on 
personalities, with a distant bishop and an exhausted, alienated vicar-general who had 
most likely been primed by resentments in Quebec and blandishments by Spanish 







Native Americans represented an interesting conundrum when addressing the 
period of the American Revolution in both Canada and the Illinois Country.  In each 
conflict, issues surrounding the Native Americans were important as contributors to the 
conflict.  In each conflict, planning for Indian intervention, or striving to avoid Indian 
intervention, obsessed commanders on both sides.  Further, in each conflict, a great deal 
of time and resources were expended upon Native diplomacy by both the Continentals 
and the British.  However, in each conflict, the Native Americans had almost no impact 
on either the battles or the outcome.  In part, this was attributable to deft European and 
American diplomacy, as all of the participants had already had extensive dealings with 
the Native American tribes over time, including the Spanish, who exerted their influence 
across the Mississippi.  However, the various Native American chiefs themselves knew 
their negotiating partners well, and for the most part had little interest in an internecine 
European conflict, being more interested in what they could gain from allowing the 
Europeans to buy their neutrality.  Henry Hamilton, the British lieutenant governor of 
Detroit, was briefly able to engage the sympathy of some of the tribes long-term, but 
circumstances conspired to render their assistance mostly ineffective.  Their direct 
involvement was limited to skirmishes at the end of the Canadian campaign and an 
attempt to wrest control of the Illinois Country from the Americans and the Spanish, an 
effort almost completely unsupported by the British themselves. 
Of all of the colonial powers in North America, France had gone farthest toward 




zones of control had experienced an early war with various Native tribes.  In Canada, 
Samuel de Champlain made the decision to ally with the Hurons against the Iroquois, a 
decision that would lead to the nearly complete annihilation of the Hurons and decades of 
war between the French and the Iroquois as the British predictably allied with the 
Iroquois; the carnage finally reached a partial halt with the Great Peace of 1701.1  In the 
Illinois Country, the Fox and Sauk nations moved against the French settlers in 1712 in a 
series of wars that lasted until 1728, when the French, along with allied tribes such as the 
Illinois Confederacy, the Kickapoo, and the Potawatomi, moved to shatter the Fox tribe.2  
In Louisiana, the Natchez ambushed and destroyed the French community at Fort Rosalie 
near the modern city of Natchez, Mississippi; again, the French replied with 
overwhelming force, destroying the Natchez tribe and forcing the few survivors to live 
among the Creeks and Chickasaw.3  A more serious conflict occurred later with the 
Chickasaw, who were more widespread and better-supplied than the Natchez; this 
conflict lasted intermittently until the cession of Louisiana to Spain.  In its most dramatic 
encounter, in 1736, the French marines and militia and their Illinois allies were drawn 
into a disastrous campaign planned by Louisiana governor the sieur de Bienville against 
the Chickasaw, in which the commandants of Vincennes and Fort de Chartres each lost 
his life.4   
In the course of settling these wars, the French and Native Americans learned to 
operate on what historian Richard White called a “middle ground,” an area where Native 
and European traditions and law could find mutually acceptable expressions that could 
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coexist.5  This “middle ground” was facilitated by the fact that unlike the English settlers, 
the French had little interest in agriculture; they were for the most part traders and 
trappers, who had a very small footprint when compared to the English.6  Even when 
agricultural villages such as Trois-Riviêres in Canada and Kaskaskia in the Illinois 
Country did arise, they were highly compact, with the villages in the pays des Illinois in 
particular founded on the premise of common fields and the commons, an area where all 
members of the community could graze their livestock and gather wood.7  In this system, 
there was little competition for land between the French and the Native Americans, and 
as the French communities remained relatively small, competition for resources was also 
limited. 
Moreover, with their small numbers and their attachment to villages, unlike the 
English plantation style of farming, French civilization in North America was similar to 
that of the Native Americans.  Although infrequent in Canada, in the pays des Illinois 
almost every French settlement had an Illinois settlement nearby; indeed, the French 
villages of Kaskaskia and Cahokia were named for the nearby Illinois tribes of each. In 
the earliest stages of the French presence the villages had been contiguous, but after the 
Fox wars in the 1720s the commandants at Fort de Chartres required the Illinois tribes to 
move their villages a certain number of miles from the French settlements.8  Even in 
Canada, the French and Native populations took care not to encroach on the territory of 
the other, and competition for land and resources was nearly non-existent.  The French 
had earlier established a simpler form of the “middle ground” among the Iroquoian 
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peoples of the eastern Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence Valley such as the Hurons, 
Petuns, and Wyandots in which the French governor at Quebec assumed the role of 
“Onontio,” the “father” of the alliance, who maintained his position with the generous 
distribution of presents; after 1701, this system preserved the peace between Native 
Americans and the French in Canada. 
On the part of the Algonquin peoples encountered by the French in the pays d’en 
haut and pays des Illinois, there were other factors involved that made the establishment 
of the “middle ground” possible.  These had suffered severe depredations from diseases 
contracted from exposure to Europeans, as had the remainder of the Native American 
peoples of North America.  Additionally, beyond the typical losses due to regional 
warfare, the Illinois Confederacy and other Algonquin peoples such as the Fox, 
Mascoutens, and Potawatomi, had suffered invasion from the imperialistic Iroquois to the 
east which had inflicted enormous losses.9  This had two effects:  the Algonquins lacked 
the strength to repel the French had they wanted to, and in fact came to depend upon a 
French alliance for survival; and the tribes that did survive frequently had to merge to 
have a chance of defending themselves, so they had to loosen their chains of authority 
and mediate their customs.10  This cultural flexibility served them well in the 
development of the “middle ground” with the French. 
The basis for all interaction between the French and the Native Americans was 
the fur trade.  Typically, the Native Americans would trap or hunt fur-bearing animals, 
then bring the furs, or “peltries,” to either Indian or French trading posts, where French 
traders would exchange trade goods for the valuable skins before bringing them back to 
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Montreal for resale.  Some of the French would attempt to acquire the furs directly, but as 
the Native Americans considered hunting grounds to be proprietary and were not 
interested in competitors, doing so was dangerous.  The colonial government in Quebec 
issued a certain number of congés, or trading licenses, but as the number of French in 
Canada and the surrounding territory increased, these were frequently ignored.11  As a 
rule, legitimate traders possessing a congé were called voyageurs, while poachers were 
called coureurs de bois, or “wood runners,” although these terms became largely 
interchangeable over time.12 
As these men made contact with the various Indian tribes, they found that sexual 
liaisons were considered to be social lubricants to form trading relationships; in addition, 
they found that Native American marriage customs were elastic compared to traditional 
Catholic marriage.13  Additionally, the ratio of women to men in Canada and the Illinois 
Country was quite small, especially in the early days of New France, so the traders were 
anxious to conduct these liaisons.  Marriage “in the fashion of the country” was at first 
denounced by the Jesuits, who were typically the first Europeans in any tribal area, as a 
threat to morals. Yet the government in Quebec, realizing that the French population in 
New France was small and mostly male, tacitly encouraged such arrangements.14  In the 
1720s, these positions became reversed.  The Jesuits encountered a great deal of success 
in converting Native women to at least a nominal form of Catholicism; this increased the 
value of virginity, and in limited fashion empowered women in Native villages, for 
whom the sexual strictures of the new religion transmuted into power to refuse partners 
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and narrow the field of acceptable mates.  Moreover, the host of female Catholic saints 
provided them with role models for resisting pressure to conform to traditional roles, and 
their cults provided a focus around which the new female converts could bond.15  As a 
result, the Jesuits, who had originally hoped that Christian French men would help them 
convert the mass of Native Americans by their example, now began to encourage French 
men to pursue Native women, confident that the piety of the women would force the men 
to acceptable behavior.  On the other hand, the Quebec and New Orleans governments, 
realizing that a substantial number of métis voluntarily chose to remain with their tribes, a 
decision frequently made by the French men themselves, began to restrict marriages 
between French men and Native women so as not to depopulate the colony.16  
Nonetheless, whether or not they were considered legitimate by French clergy or colonial 
officials, these unions and their children formed lasting kin networks between the French 
and various Native tribes, which exerted influence over communities of both peoples.17 
This, then, was the world that the British entered when they acquired the 
possessions of the former New France:  a highly interconnected milieu, held together by 
hybrid customs worked out over a century and by familial relationships in many cases 
going back nearly that long.  The British, on the other hand, had relied on their superior 
technological abilities to produce higher-quality trade goods at lower prices to attach 
Native allies to them.  This strategy was useful in coaxing many tribes into neutrality 
during the wars between Britain and France, but the voracious British appetite for land 
engendered by the plantation farming system was a significant obstacle to forming long-
                                                 
15 Sleeper-Smith, 26. 
16 Ibid. 




lasting relationships with the Native Americans.  Moreover, British colonial society was 
more structured and segregated than was that of the French.  Few of the British could 
subsume their identity into Native society for even short periods of time.18 
At the conclusion of the French and Indian War, Native Americans realized that 
with the final departure of French military forces, there no longer existed a European 
counterweight to British power in North America, the existence of which had been 
crucial to maintaining relations with different tribes.19  Becoming frightened by the 
sudden prospect of British domination, the Native Americans began a policy of armed 
resistance, creating an alliance under Ottawa chief Pontiac in 1763.  Besides the fear of 
being forced from their lands, the tribes of the pays d’en haut and the Ohio Valley had 
been deeply offended by the British policy of converting the generous gifts of the French 
into fairly parsimonious payment for services rendered; moreover, they strongly 
suspected the British of cheating their hunters by plying them with alcohol, which had 
been strictly against the policy of the French.20  In large part due to Pontiac’s recognition 
that the center of power in the Algonquin world had shifted from the tribes to the villages 
where warriors of many tribes held the chiefs of individual tribes in less esteem, which 
allowed him to quickly gather warriors without alerting the British, Pontiac’s Rebellion 
nearly succeeded in seizing all of the British posts in the pays d’en haut, which would 
have made it difficult for the British to project power in the region.21 However, the 
critical forts at Detroit, Fort Pitt, and Niagara held out, and the uprising collapsed, 
partially because the British were able to quickly take back the lost forts from those 
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locations, but also because by embracing the role the British thrust upon him as a ruler of 
the tribes rather than as a traditional chief, Pontiac alienated the warriors and lost their 
respect.22  Another more deadly series of conflicts began as Virginia settlers began to 
move through the Cumberland Gap into Kentucky at the conclusion of the French and 
Indian War; this area was a prized Native hunting ground, and the Shawnee and Miami 
peoples rose up to defend them.  Over the course of the next forty years, Kentucky would 
become known as the “dark and bloody ground,” bedeviling British and Americans 
alike.23 
It was this state of affairs that led to the halt to land speculation west of the 
Appalachian Mountains in the Royal Proclamation of 1763:  the British had wearied of 
fighting the Native Americans during the French and Indian War, and the metropolitan 
government was perfectly content to leave Indian lands to the Indians.  However, the 
burgeoning English population was overwhelming the space available in the old colonies 
to provide plantation-style farms, and poverty in the cities and in the rural areas was high.  
As a result, with nothing to lose, settlers flooded into Kentucky, flagrantly defying the 
Proclamation.24  Speculators such as the Loyal Land Company and private men of means 
such as George Washington and Thomas Jefferson were effectively blocked from legally 
parceling land in Kentucky by the Proclamation and subsequent Acts of Parliament 
confirming it, but little could be done to prevent settlers in the backcountry from 
gathering up their goods and moving west, even though they understood that their claims 
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to the land would be void if the Proclamation were ever revoked.25  Moreover, the 
Proclamation had done nothing to establish the western borders of the colonies, or to 
establish who was responsible for its enforcement.  As a result, in 1774, the royal 
governor of Virginia launched an invasion of Shawnee hunting grounds in what became 
known as Lord Dunmore’s War.26  The Quebec Act was in part an attempt to restore 
order by granting jurisdiction over all of “Indian Country” to the governor and council of 
Quebec, but the colonists were not to be deprived of their farm land. Thus, it was the 
issue of western lands as much as concerns over “popery” or rule by fiat that caused 
colonists to include amongst the other “Intolerable Acts.” 
The attitude of the regular British army concerning Native warfare had been 
shaped by the French and Indian War.  In particular, British military officials sought to 
overcome the mistakes made during the siege of Fort William Henry, in which after 
having been granted safe conduct by commanding French general Louis-Joseph de 
Montcalm, much of the English garrison and its support staff was massacred by the 
Indian allies of the French, with Montcalm and his officers unable to restrain the 
warriors.27  As a result, the British certainly had no desire to fight Indian warriors; in 
addition, most senior British officers had little desire to fight alongside the tribes, whom 
they considered unpredictable and barbaric.  This attitude did not entirely filter down to 
the junior officers, especially those who commanded posts in the west, in close proximity 
to Native Americans.  The willingness of men such as Henry Hamilton in Detroit and 
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Arent de Peyster in Michilimackinac to make use of Indian warriors, as opposed to 
Carleton’s reluctance to do so, would represent an important distinction between the 
campaign in Canada in 1775 and that in the Illinois Country in 1778. 
After Pontiac’s Rebellion, the British slowly came to understand the value of the 
relationships between the French and the Native Americans and began to leverage similar 
relationships between different tribes and the British Crown.  The British superintendent 
for Indian affairs, Sir William Johnson, proved to be adept at managing these 
relationships, as was his deputy, George Croghan.  However, it was not long before the 
British discovered what the French had long known:  maintaining good relations with the 
various Native tribes required a large expense in trade goods.28  As the British Ministry 
was more focused on the economic value of the colonies and less on the religious and 
geopolitical missions of the French, the royal governors, constantly called to account by 
the Lords of Trade and the Ministry, were frequently parsimonious with these gifts, 
which in turn caused the Native Americans to doubt the sincerity of British negotiators.29  
As the American Revolution approached, the British had managed to form a working 
relationship with many of the western tribes by returning the number of presents they 
distributed to nearly the level of the former French regime, but it never reached the depth 
of the Native ties with the French, due largely to lacking the kinship component. This 
lack of depth would be reflected in their constancy in warfare, particularly on extended 
campaigns.30 
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In Canada, both the Continental and British leadership had the same goal: to deny 
the enemy the use of Indian warriors, but otherwise to keep them neutral.  This goal was 
not shared by Sir Guy Johnson, who had succeeded his uncle as Superintendent of Indian 
Affairs and proposed a more formal military alliance with the Native tribes.31  However, 
Carleton had served as a field-grade officer in the French and Indian War and retained 
bitter memories of Indian warfare. He furthermore held a paternalistic idea of the Atlantic 
colonists as wayward children of the Empire rather than true enemies and as such refused 
to entertain the idea.  At one point, 1500 Iroquois warriors offered their services to the 
governor, but Carleton refused politely, thanking them, distributing the gifts to them that 
had been intended by London to purchase their active military assistance, and requesting 
their continued non-intervention.32  While his communications with London and with 
Thomas Gage, commander of British troops in the Atlantic colonies, in New York 
indicated that he based this decision on the unreliability of the Native Americans, he 
made his personal opinion clear in private correspondence:  “I would not even suffer a 
Savage to pass the frontier, though often urged to let them loose on the Rebel Provinces, 
lest cruelties might have been committed, and for fear the innocent might have suffered 
with the guilty.”33 
On the part of the Continentals, the leadership seemed to assume from the outset 
that most Indian involvement in the Canada campaign would be on the behalf of the 
British, so its efforts were almost entirely focused on persuading the Native Americans to 
remain uninvolved.  Ethan Allen, the Vermont colonel of militia, considered it to have 
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been a diplomatic coup to have persuaded the Native Americans of the Montreal region 
not to join Carleton.  However, most Canadian tribes had already decided to remain 
neutral, and at any rate the British governor would not have asked for nor accepted their 
assistance.34  As a result, except for individuals employed as couriers or for 
reconnaissance, the Native presence had little effect on the contest in Canada at any point 
in which the outcome was in doubt. 
By contrast, the proximate cause of the Virginian invasion of Illinois was the 
tangled relationship between the Native Americans (primarily the Shawnee, the Miami, 
and the Potawatomi nations), the British, and the English backcountry settlers in 
Kentucky.  Like Carleton, Hamilton, the lieutenant-governor at Detroit, had served in the 
British Army during the French and Indian War; unlike Carleton, he had served most of 
his subsequent career in the western regions of British North America, in daily contact 
with Native Americans. As a result, he had developed a more nuanced view of their 
methods than had the reserved and courtly Carleton.   
Moreover, in 1777 Lord George Germain became Secretary of State for the 
colonies.  Germain was determined to take a more active hand in colonial affairs than had 
his predecessor, Lord Dartmouth, and in addition was a bitter personal enemy of 
Carleton.35  On March 26 of that year, Germain sent Carleton an order on behalf of the 
king to command Hamilton to assemble the Native warriors in his district for war, 
carefully worded to allow Carleton no room for maneuver; this, among other factors, 
caused the violent split between Carleton and Germain that resulted in Carleton’s 
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replacement as governor of Canada later in the year.  Nonetheless, Carleton’s hand was 
forced, and he relayed the order to Hamilton.36 
The situation in Kentucky regarding both Native Americans and the English 
settlers had only become more complicated since the end of Lord Dunmore’s War.  This 
could be seen in in the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in November of 1768, signed by the British 
and the Six Iroquois Nations.37  In this document, the Iroquois League, who technically 
retained control over Shawnee and Miami lands (although they no longer had the ability 
in practice to rule these lands), had sold their rights to Kentucky for a massive load of 
trade goods.  This was an easy deal for the Iroquois since they had no enforceable claim 
on the territory anyway.38  The Shawnee and the Miami refused to recognize the Treaty of 
Fort Stanwix, which had resulted in Lord Dunmore’s War, in which some but not all of 
the Shawnee villages had surrendered their rights to Kentucky to the Virginians.   
To cloud matters further, the Cherokee, who also had some hunting rights to the 
area, had sold their claims to Kentucky in the Treaty of Hard Labor in October of 1768, 
which in any case they could not have held against the Shawnee, let alone the 
Virginians.39  In all of these negotiations, the majority of the Shawnee, particularly those 
of the village of Chillicothe, protested that they had neither been represented nor had 
agreed to any of these terms, and when their protests were ignored resorted to large-scale 
raids.40 
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These raids increased in frequency and ferocity as Hamilton in Detroit began 
rewarding attacks by the various tribes on the Kentucky settlements, offering some 
money for scalps and more for prisoners.41  The Shawnee war chief Blackfish led raids 
against the country surrounding Harrodsburg and Boonesborough from March to May 
1777.42  In late June 1777, Hamilton called a council of warriors from not only the 
Shawnee and Miami peoples of the north bank of the Ohio, but also the nations of the 
pays d’en haut that centered around Detroit, among which were the Potawatomi, the 
Ottawa, and the Ojibwe.43  By September of 1777, Hamilton claimed to have over 1100 
Native warriors engaged in raids against the Kentucky settlers, several times the number 
of Virginians fit for militia duty.44  Fortunately for the Patriot cause, Clark had ascended 
to the leadership of Kentucky’s militia forces.  He proved to be an able organizer and 
strategist, and was further aided by the arrival of a company of Virginia militia under the 
command of Colonel John Bowman in that September.  The Kentucky settlers had 
survived the year of 1777, but Clark knew that defense against such odds was impossible 
in the long term. He suspected that there would be few further reinforcements from 
Virginia in time to affect the outcome. 
Desperately casting about for some means of relief, Clark began to think about the 
Illinois Country.  Having done business at Vincennes in the past, he knew that the French 
were on intimate terms with the Native Americans. To his military mind it would make 
sense for the British to use remote posts that were known and familiar for their Native 
American allies and under British control as staging grounds for the attacks that were 
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crushing Kentucky.  In a letter to a Continental official in Williamsburg, most likely 
Patrick Henry, Clark made the case for an invasion: 
On the commencement of the present war, the [British] troops 
were called off to reinforce Detroit, which is about three hundred miles 
from it – leaving the fort and all its stores in care of one Roseblack 
[Rocheblave] as commandant of the place, with instructions to influence 
as many Indians as possible to invade the Colonies . . . Roseblock who 
acted as Governor, by large presents engaged the Waubash Indians to 
invade the frontiers of Kentucky; was daily treating with other Nations, 
giving large presents and offering them great rewards for scalps.45 
Clark concluded darkly, “I am sensible that the case stands thus – that either take 
the town of Kuskuskies, or in less than a twelve month send an army against the Indians 
on Wabash, which will cost ten times as much, and not be of half the service.”46 
In the meantime, Rocheblave, who had since moved across the Mississippi from 
Ste. Genevieve after a dispute with the Spanish lieutenant-governor in St. Louis. 
Promoted to commandant of Kaskaskia by the departing Hugh Lord in 1776, Rocheblave 
may indeed have had it in mind to recruit Native warriors to help defend Kaskaskia.  He 
had considerable experience with the Native Americans, dating back to the French and 
Indian War, and did not scruple to employ them against the Virginians.  However, he 
found himself unable to do so; the Native tribes in the region seemed uninterested in his 
entreaties.  Much of this reticence must be attributed to a general antipathy toward the 
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British, dating back to Pontiac’s Rebellion, and the sense among Native Americans that 
any conflict that caused exclusively British casualties need not concern them.  In 
correspondence with his superiors in Detroit, Quebec, and even London, though, 
Rocheblave had another culprit in mind: 
It has been necessary for me to break up the designs and evil 
intentions of our neighbors, the Spaniards, and to dissipate the injurious 
impression they have sought to give the savages against the present 
government, in seeking to renew the small degree of inclination they have 
had for the old, and to give from time to time something to the vast tribes 
who inhabit our boundless forests.47 
In a letter to Haldimand, Rocheblave related an incident that he felt demonstrated 
conclusively that the Spanish had been conspiring with the Native Americans to aid the 
Americans: “Four months ago, after the arrival of the boats from New Orleans, the 
Spaniards sent off by night three men to carry letters to Fort Pitt.  They spread the story 
that they were going to hunt on the Beautiful [Ohio] River.  Although I did not credit the 
report, I have only recently been assured of the fact by two savages who met them.”48  
Rocheblave had served for several years as a commandant under the Spanish government 
at St. Louis prior to assuming his post at Kaskaskia.  Although the dispute that drove him 
across the Mississippi may have inclined Rocheblave to exaggerate Spanish perfidy, it is 
also true that few would have been in a better position to understand Spanish designs on 
the British bank of the Mississippi. 
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Unaware that Rocheblave had been unsuccessful in acquiring Native support for 
Kaskaskia, after some deliberation during which Clark himself made the journey to 
Williamsburg to present his plan. Virginia governor Patrick Henry and his council 
approved Clark’s venture on January 2, 1778.49  Clark was given secret orders to raise 
seven companies of militia with which to march upon Kaskaskia. He was even ordered 
not to tell General Edward Hand at Fort Pitt about the mission, even though Clark was to 
request transports for his men. Henry provided Clark with an anodyne set of orders to 
pass to Hand.50  In the official orders, issued the next day, the connection back to the 
Native Americans was made stark:   
As some Indian Tribes to the westward of the Mississippi have 
lately without any provocations massacred many of the Inhabitants of the 
Frontiers of this Commonwealth in the most cruel & barbarous Manner & 
it is intended to revenge the Injury & punish the Aggressors by carrying 
the War into their own Country . . . We think it just & reasonable that each 
Volunteer entering as a common Soldier in this Expedition, should be 
allowed three hundred Acres of Land & the Officers in the usual 
proportion, out of the Lands which may be conquered in the Country now 
in the possession of the said Indians, so as not to interfere with the Claims 
of any friendly Indians, or of any people willing to become Subjects of 
this Commonwealth.51 
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Since in the event there were no wars against any of the Native nations in the 
course of Clark’s campaign in the Illinois Country, the promised reward caused some 
confusion at the conclusion of the Revolution. 
Continued Native raids on Kentucky forced Clark to continually modify his plans.  
He had initially planned to recruit the bulk of his force from the Kentucky militias.  
However, with the number of Native warriors arriving from the pay d’en haut ever 
increasing, he decided against leaving the settlements defenseless.  Not wanting to split 
the militias so evenly that both the invasion and defense forces were insufficiently 
manned, Clark decided to take only one and one-half companies – about 75 men – from 
Kentucky, and hope that recruitment from Virginia would make up the difference.52  Even 
with the new recruits, however, Clark’s invasion force only came up to four companies in 
total, which again forced him to alter his plans.53  He had expected to march against 
Vincennes first, as it was the closest and richest target.  However, knowing that 
Vincennes had a militia of four hundred men and was situated within easy reach of 
several allied Indian villages, he decided to first strike French villages on the Mississippi, 
since although they had more men in total, they were more spread out and less likely to 
be able to quickly assemble a defense.54 
It is uncertain how critical a factor the influence of the habitants with the various 
Native tribes was on the eve of the invasion.  At the end of the French and Indian War, 
the habitants conspired with various tribes to hinder the approach of the British to Fort de 
Chartres and Kaskaskia, even defying the last vestiges of French authority to do so.  The 
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kinship ties of the habitants with the Native Americans, particularly the Potawatomi of 
the St. Joseph River region, were strong enough that after the British attack on Cahokia 
was repulsed in 1780, forces from Cahokia marched on British trading posts to avenge 
wrongs done to métis relatives at St. Joseph.  In turn, after the Revolution those ties were 
still strong enough that a daughter of those St. Joseph relatives living in Cahokia was able 
to convince a Native raiding party against attempting to massacre the American 
inhabitants of the town.55  Yet no Native Americans other than those from the Illinois 
tribes themselves – the Kaskaskia, Cahokia, and Peoria – were noted by Clark until they 
came to Cahokia at his invitation.  It is possible that most of the warriors that could have 
come to Cahokia’s defense were already committed in Kentucky. More likely, however, 
the habitants themselves were simply complacent.  The French and Indian War had raged 
around them for seven years. The tribes had contributed troops to the defense of France, 
and yet the war had not touched them until a year after its conclusion. They had long 
since grown used to the benign neglect of the great powers, an assumption that was about 
to prove no longer operative.   
Still, though, an urgent appeal for rescue by the habitants to their Indian friends 
and family would most likely be heeded. Clark fretted about releasing such an appeal 
until well after he had secured the villages and defeated Hamilton at Vincennes.  In the 
end, the Native Americans did not participate in the conflicts either in Canada or the 
Illinois Country, but the shadow they cast was the fulcrum around which Clark’s entire 
campaign swung, and their presence was hardly less felt by Montgomery or Carleton.
                                                 






As demonstrated by the fact that “worthless as a Continental” became idiomatic 
during the Revolution, money was a constant source of concern for the Continental 
Congress.  With little power to tax and having lost access to the reserves of the Bank of 
England, Continental paper money was indeed worthless in a world of specie. What hard 
currency the fledgling government had available to it had to be carefully husbanded and 
spent; foreign governments and firms were under no obligation to accept Continental 
dollars, and generally did not.  With little money to spend procuring domestic goods and 
establishing supply chains and depots, undertaking foreign invasions, which the 
operations in Canada and the Illinois Country represented, were risky financial ventures.  
There was no guarantee that French merchants and farmers would accept Continental 
paper money without a resort to force, and to force them to accept the money would most 
likely drive even sympathizers back into the arms of the British. 
For the French colonists in North America in particular, paper currency was 
especially odious.  During the French and Indian War, the French government had forced 
paper livres onto their colonists as a wartime measure; having nearly bankrupted the 
national treasury in the global Seven Years’ War of which the French and Indian War 
was a relatively small part, the metropolitan government was prepared to engage in 
extreme measures to remain solvent.  Further, having lost the war and its North American 
possessions along with it, the French ministers of finance were not especially responsive 
to the complaints of their now-former colonies.  In June of 1764, a royal decree fixed the 




debt of 83,000,000 livres, only 37,606,000 would be repaid, with the remainder in 
default.1  One debt, in particular, incurred at 15,958,729 livres, was unilaterally reduced 
by approximately sixty percent, to 6,655,000 livres.2  As the king represented the court of 
final appeal, and there was little the British could do to force the French to pay anything 
once both sides agreed to the terms of peace, the Canadian economy collapsed .3  Having 
worked for years to regain their solvency, the Canadians remained determined that they 
would not be left in this position again, particularly the French mercantile class.  The 
merchants and wealthier habitants in the pays des Illinois were not immune to the effect 
of this massive default, although the impact to that class was less visible in the Illinois 
Country because the majority of the wealthier inhabitants immediately moved to St. 
Louis. 
As the invasion of Canada approached in 1775, Congress was not unaware of 
these problems, nor were their enemies in Canada or Britain.  Through July and August 
1775, the pro-government Quebec Gazette printed two letters, one French-language letter 
from “Le Canadien Patriote” and one English-language letter from “An English Farmer.” 
Both sought to inspire reticent bourgeois and habitants to more actively support the cause 
of the governor.  Each of these letters portrayed a scenario wherein an invading 
Continental army, running low on food at the approach of winter, would force Canadian 
farmers to accept “Philadelphia” notes. The fact that such currency could not be spent on 
overseas goods was of particular concern to the Canadians. The mercantilist system 
pursued by both Britain and France had hindered the development of Canadian 
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manufacture, as most finished goods had to come from Britain so that the Canadian 
markets would be effectively starved.4 
Nevertheless, there were still merchants, especially in the Montreal region, that 
were willing to accept Continental dollars on a temporary basis if necessary.  For the 
most part, these were the British “Old Subjects” that had come to Canada anxious for the 
opportunities that they imagined would arise from dominating the political scene of an 
Anglicized Canada, only to be thwarted by Murray, Carleton, and the ministry of Lord 
North in London.  Foremost among these was Thomas Walker, an English-born merchant 
who came to Montreal in 1763 after ten years in Boston to engage in the fur trade.5  He 
quickly entered Canadian politics by being elected as a justice of the peace, benefitting 
from the fact that as the Test Act remained in force in Canada, only Protestants were 
eligible to vote.  Walker betrayed his Yankee sentiments by consistently ruling against 
the military, particularly in cases where they were billeted amongst Montreal citizens.6  
The antagonism between Walker and Montreal commandant Ralph Butler exploded in 
the fall of 1764, when a civil magistrate claimed to have reserved a room in a fine guest 
house in which an army captain named Payne was billeted; when Payne refused to give 
up the billet, Walker ordered the captain arrested.7  Shortly after that, Walker advised 
Montreal residents to refuse firewood and bedclothes to any troops that were quartered in 
their homes.8  Furious, some of the soldiers in the city attacked Walker on the night of 
December 10, 1764, seriously battering him and cutting off his ear.9  The case inflamed 
                                                 
4 Ibid., ch. 6, loc. 1675. 
5 Wrong, 63. 
6 Anderson, ch. 3, loc. 719. 






the entire citizenry of Montreal.  Murray investigated but did nothing to intervene.  
However, upon succeeding Murray, the more severe but fair-minded Carleton had the 
perpetrators arrested in the dead of night, although only one indictment was delivered and 
that officer was found not guilty.10 
Already inclined toward the boisterous populism typical of Boston, Walker 
became embittered toward the military government at Quebec and toward the French-
Canadian establishment that supported it.  He became the center of an anti-government 
“British Party” that was at constant odds with the pro-government “French Party.” The 
news of the assault, known as the “Thomas Walker Affair,” spread beyond Canada and 
attracted the notice of Patriot leaders in New York and Boston.11  In the view of the 
British Party, the “Old Subjects” had been led to believe by the Royal Proclamation of 
1763 that British law, including the Test Act, would eventually rule in Quebec, and that 
the military government was temporary. The outraged Old Subjects argued that they 
would  have migrated to Canada had they realized that the Ministry would be so slow to 
institute proper British laws and institutions.12   The passage of the Quebec Act in 1774 
appalled them, and they continued to petition the Crown. The embittered British residents 
of Canada also began writing letters to New York newspapers so as not to fully commit 
themselves to any action.13   
British colonists along the Atlantic seaboard protested the Quebec Act on several 
grounds.  The Act placed all British territory west of the Appalachians within the 
jurisdiction of Canada, which was bad enough from the Continental perspective. 
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However, the subsequent Quebec Revenue Act attempted to solve the Canadian revenue 
problem by placing an import duty on rum and molasses coming into Canada. As British 
colonists in the “old thirteen” colonies paid a much higher rate for their imported sugar 
they deeply resented the perceived Parliamentary bias in favor of Canada 14    
French authorities had forbidden the sale of rum to Native Americans in the fur 
trade. Following the French and Indian War, British officials allowed the practice. Rum 
quickly became the primary trade good for the British in the fur trade, but the restrictions 
of the Quebec Revenue Act meant that any Atlantic colonist that went into “Indian 
Country” to trade with Native Americans not only had to pay duties that Canadians did 
not, but that to reach a Canadian customs house, he frequently had to go one hundred or 
more miles out of his way.15  The New York Assembly claimed that the two acts taken 
together had destroyed the New York fur trade.16  This may not only have been true but 
may not have been inadvertent on the part of the government in London, as one of the 
primary purposes of the Quebec Act was to reduce the chance of conflict with the 
Indians.  From the government’s perspective, the fewer Europeans and the less rum were 
present among the tribes, the more likely would be the desired policy outcome. 
The first overt act of cooperation between the “Old Subjects” in Canada and the 
lower thirteen colonies came in September of 1774, when, along with a note of sympathy, 
Quebec merchant Jonas Clarke Minot sent a load of grain to Boston. Collected by British 
merchants in Quebec, the grain proved vital to Bostonians blockaded by the Royal Navy 
in the aftermath of the Boston Tea Party.17  Over the ensuing months, the relationships 
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between the northern and southern British merchants deepened. Although the Canadians 
remained cautious about the Patriot prospects if an armed conflict arose, and Canadian 
merchants were still deeply skeptical of the Continental Association and its embargo on 
British trade, it was at least clear that the Continentals had allies to the north.18 
Commerce in the form of the fur trade was also an early point of contention 
between the eastern and western stretches of Britain’s newly-expanded North American 
empire, which to some degree bled over into relations between Canada and the Atlantic 
colonies.  With Spain in control of New Orleans at the mouth of the Mississippi as well 
as the newly ascendant trading center of St. Louis directly across the river from Cahokia, 
the French in the pays des Illinois had every incentive to trade with Spanish merchants as 
opposed to making the long trek to Montreal or the arduous upstream journey to Fort Pitt.  
Moreover, the fur traders of the Illinois Country and Upper Louisiana had long-standing 
ties of friendship, and often kinship, with the tribes to their north and west. This meant 
that the product of a huge fur-rich region was funneled through Spanish instead of British 
ports.   
With British forces now in control of the St. Lawrence, British Canadian 
merchants possessing a decisive advantage over the Spanish and French in the quantity 
and price of the trade goodsavailable to them. Despite their newfound economic 
advantages, though, the tangled skein of overlapping British authority hindered and 
nearly ruined the British merchant community in Canada.  Murray and later Carleton at 
Quebec were sympathetic to their plight, but between the end of the French and Indian 
War in 1763 and the passage of the Quebec Act in 1774, many of the best hunting 
                                                 




grounds were under the authority of Governor Thomas Gage and Superintendent of 
Indian Affairs Sir William Johnson in New York. These regions were subject to stringent 
regulations, the most difficult being that traders were required to trade at posts instead of 
among the tribes.19  With the traders on the Spanish side of the Mississippi unbound by 
any such consideration and the coureurs du bois from Cahokia and Kaskaskia flatly 
ignoring Parliamentary restrictions and trading with the Indians in their villages, this 
represented a crushing impediment to the Canadian fur trade.20  Finally, in 1766, Carleton 
appealed to the Lords of Trade in London. He bitterly and eloquently made the case that 
New York merchants were ruining both themselves and Montreal traders by trying to 
handicap the latter with impracticable regulations. Gage eventually came to agree with 
Carleton.21  The attention brought to the French villages on the east bank of the 
Mississippi was not entirely welcome, as Murray and the Earl of Hillsborough, Secretary 
of State for the colonies until 1772, considered plans to move the habitants out of the 
region entirely and back to Canada. They hoped to thus resolve the trade issues and to 
remove them as a potential flashpoint for war with the Indians.22  Fortunately for them, 
however, Murray and Hillsborough were replaced by Carleton and the Earl of Dartmouth, 
who were swayed both by considerations of mercy and the arguments of the French 
villagers’ cousins in Montreal. Murray and Hillsborough came to see the voyageurs of the 
Illinois Country as valuable assets in the internecine trade war between Montreal and 
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New York, provided that they could be convinced to shift at least some of their 
commerce from Louisiana to Canada.23 
As in Montreal and Quebec, the beginnings of revolutionary sentiment in the 
Illinois Country were to be found among the few British merchants whose dreams of land 
speculation profits had been crushed by the Quebec Act.  Chief among these were 
brothers Daniel and William Murray, who had entered the Illinois Country as speculators 
and remained as traders. Richard Winston, who had lived in the area since he had been 
sent by the Bayton, Wharton, and Morgan Company just after the French and Indian War, 
in 1766 likewise proved a leading voice for British merchants in the Illinois Country. 
Thomas Bentley, a storekeeper who had maintained a shop in Manchac, just north of 
New Orleans, before coming to Kaskaskia and marrying into the prominent Beauvais 
family, also became an ally.24  As mentioned before, these men found themselves in 
immediate conflict with Rocheblave and finding the British authorities in Quebec and 
New York uninterested in their complaints; became receptive to Patriot arguments 
radiating out from Boston and New York.  According to Rocheblave, this culminated in a 
meeting between agents of Bentley and of Clark, where in addition to trade, Clark’s men 
were able to ascertain how many armed men defended Kaska the strength and morale of 
the military forces guarding Kaskaskia.  Such accusations led to Bentley’s arrest and 
detention for several years at Detroit.25  In his memoirs, Clark mentioned having sent 
spies into the Illinois Country a year or so before he moved against the villages, and 
named Winston and Daniel Murray as his first friendly contacts at Kaskaskia when he 
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occupied the town.  He never connected the reconnaissance mission directly with the 
British merchants; however, given their immediate defection to Clark, Rocheblave’s 
suspicions seem credible.26 
While the British merchants in Canada swung rapidly toward the Continental 
cause, their more numerous and prosperous French counterparts were more cautious.  
Unlike their brethren in Montreal and Quebec, the French merchants in the pays des 
Illinois had lived through years of neglect, mismanagement, and corruption on the part of 
their new British masters; while Quebec had Carleton, Kaskaskia had Wilkins.  While 
French merchants had little love for either British soldiers or colonists, there remained 
nascent commercial ties between Kentucky and the Illinois villages.  Moreover, French 
Canadians retained memories of the bloodthirsty Bastonnais, the term by which all 
Atlantic colonists were known to them.27  Knowing that war might well be coming, and 
with no natural loyalties on either side, the French merchants supported the side that most 
closely aligned with their business interests. 
One such merchant was Charles Gratiot, a French-speaking Protestant from 
Lausanne, Switzerland. London educated, he left to seek employment in Canada at 
eighteen in 1765.  Nine years later, Gratiot moved to Cahokia to manage his Montreal 
partners’ affairs.28   Gratiot’s correspondence displays considerable sang-froid in its 
juxtaposition of commercial and wartime affairs, as in this undated fragment, perhaps 
talking about his wife:  
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“ . . . follows without seeing me, no more than my friends, exposed to 
dangers to which the scourges of war often lead.  She fears that the storm, 
perceived by all, is not ready to dissipate.  At any rate, I wish to engage them in 
commerce, for them to come every autumn to bring goods from market in New 
Orleans . . .”29   
Throughout his wartime correspondence, Gratiot spoke of the war as a regrettable 
imposition on his affairs and plans.  In a March 1778 letter to his Montreal partner 
William Hay, Gratiot wrote of arrangements he had made for a trade expedition to New 
Orleans (translation by archivist): 
It is very easy to arrange the plan I propose . . . unless this 
unfortunate war should continue as there is too much appearance.  The 
Rebels have taken a boat loaded with goods in the Ohio, belonging to an 
Inhabitant of this side, and took it and crew to New Orleans.  Several of 
my friends from that city have assured me that all the vessels belonging to 
the Bostonians were admitted into the ports of the French and Spanish, 
that they are openly protected by the two nations, they obtain all they want 
of ammunition or anything else necessary, which proves how long the war 
will endure.30 
While not displaying much sympathy for the British government, Gratiot was 
annoyed that the Continentals were interfering with commerce, as evidenced by his use of 
“rebels” and “Bastonnais,” and his obvious irritation that the Spanish in New Orleans 
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were allowing them to prolong the war.  His attitude toward the war did not appear to 
change much after Clark seized Kaskaskia and Cahokia; he wrote his father in 1779 that 
“I wait but for peace between America and England, and a treaty of commerce between 
them . . . The English side of this country is taken by the Americans since July last.  I 
much fear that Canada will experience the same fate in the course of the winter; this 
might occasion us much injury, in that we could not send our peltries to England.”31  This 
was well after he had declared for the Americans and put his considerable resources 
completely at Clark’s disposal. While it was true that, as governor and historian John 
Reynolds put it, “the spirit of his dear native Switzerland burned strong in his heart for 
liberty,” Gratiot’s correspondence makes it clear that his business interests at least 
informed every move he made.32 
Of greater wealth and prominence was Gabriel Cerré, who had moved to 
Kaskaskia in 1755 and had amassed a considerable fortune by eschewing the easier trade 
route to New Orleans in favor of the more arduous trek to Montreal, which for much of 
his career he conducted personally.33  Cerré and fellow trader Louis Viviat were seen as 
the leaders of the French faction supporting Rocheblave against the cabal of British 
merchants in Kaskaskia. Having received reports of this, most likely from Bentley’s 
agents, Clark saw Cerré as pivotal in securing the loyalties of the Kaskaskia merchants 
and habitants.34  While it had been reported to Clark that Cerré was one of his “most 
inveterate enemies,” Clark also indicated that he had reason to believe that Cerré could be 
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persuaded to join the Continental cause.35  To be certain, Clark considered Cerré as a 
leader of the Rocheblave party, Rocheblave having describing him to Henry Hamilton in 
Detroit as “an honest merchant” trusted with important business.36  In April of that year, 
Cerré’s attorney delivered a letter to Rocheblave on behalf of a tutor for recently 
orphaned children. The tutor asked that she is kept in her position, and that Cerré is 
appointed as guardian of the children, with control over their shares of the parents’ estate.  
Rocheblave responded immediately by writing in  the letter’s margin that he could not 
approve the arrangement. Cerré could choose another tutor, but would be required to 
subrogate any power over the children’s affairs to the tutor and to “enjoin him to watch 
over the interests of the minors in the shares that [the previous tutor] had desired.”37  
Given this implied lack of trust, it was quite possible that the relationship between 
Rocheblave and Cerré had deteriorated somewhat.  Certainly, the episode illustrated that, 
as with Gratiot, business considerations were a powerful factor in Cerré’s motivations. 
Gratiot and Cerré eventually shared an interesting familial connection:  Gratiot 
married the sister of Auguste Chouteau, who along with Pierre Laclede had founded St. 
Louis and rapidly became one of its wealthiest inhabitants.  Chouteau married Cerré’s 
daughter married Chouteau in 1786.38  Cerré had been smuggling in St. Louis for some 
time. Given that Gratiot married Victoire Chouteau only three weeks after his move to St. 
Louis, it is a reasonable assumption that he too had been engaged in similar commerce 
for some length of time.39  Among their other ventures, the Chouteau family maintained a 
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“continental store” that eventually, at the behest of Spanish colonial officials , became an 
entrepot through which flowed goods from New Orleans to Clark’s invasion force.40  The 
Cahokia and Kaskaskia merchants thus enjoyed close relations with the Chouteaus, 
whom in turn served the confidants of successive Spanish lieutenant-governors in St. 
Louis.  Given that Spanish interests lay with the Continentals in their struggle with Great 
Britain, it seems likely that both Gratiot and Cerré were keenly aware of the considerable 
advantages that would accrue to them if they facilitated Spanish strategy by aligning 
themselves with the Virginians when they eventually made their move. 
On the eve of war, then, British merchants in both Canada and the pays des 
Illinois, weary of French collusion with their own government, formed the nucleus of 
pro-Continental sentiment.  The attitude of the French bourgeoisie, on the other hand, 
was markedly different in both regions.  While the French merchants in Montreal and 
Quebec were a besieged and weakened minority who felt dependent upon British  
protection, traders in  Kaskaskia and Cahokia were still largely masters of their fate.  As 
in so many other areas, the proximity of another imperial power provided the Illinois 
French with options unavailable to their northern cousins.  In the coming conflict, many 
seemingly sudden decisions made by the French traders become more comprehensible by 
bearing this relationship in mind.
                                                 






The seizure of Fort Ticonderoga by the Continentals on May 10, 1775, was the 
first action of the war with Immediate implications for Canada.  Commanding the 
junctions of Lakes Champlain and George between New York and Vermont, the fort was 
crucial in controlling traffic between Canada and the colonies to the south.  In Quebec, 
Carleton had recognized the critical strategic importance of the location and had implored 
both Thomas Gage at New York and the metropolitan government in London to reinforce 
it, to no avail.251  The leaders of the Continental Congress shared Carleton’s appraisal and 
reacted rapidly to the situation. Their first concerns were defensive and logistical. 
American leaders wanted to cut off a potential British assault from the northeast and seize 
the fort’s cannons for the Patriot cause.252   
However, Continental Army officers such as Benedict Arnold were also 
motivated by intelligence gathered by a Continental agent named John Brown, who had 
visited Montreal in the spring of 1775.  Brown had reported that the “British Party” in 
Montreal was strongly sympathetic to the American cause.  However, the British 
merchants were cowed by Carleton and concerned that a premature declaration of 
independence by their southern neighbors would provoke the French into an open 
alliance with the governor.253   Brown, though, remained convinced that the “Old 
Subjects” in Montreal would enthusiastically participate in an American occupation and 
that the habitants would quickly submit to American military force.254 
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Accordingly, Silas Deane in Connecticut and Benedict Arnold in Massachusetts 
organized expeditions to take the fort.  The troops dispatched by Deane soon joined with 
a small company under Brown and a larger force of “Green Mountain Boys” led by Ethan 
Allen; this force was already on the march when it was met by Arnold and aide James 
Easton.  Working in uneasy concert, Allen and Arnold led the combined 300-man force 
against the fort. They caught the small, fifty-man British garrison completely by surprise 
and captured not merely Fort Ticonderoga but also the nearby fort of Crown Point.255   
Both Allen and Arnold were daring and ambitious commanders. With Brown 
along to provide intelligence on the situation in Montreal, they could not resist the 
temptation to advance quickly across Lake George and Lake Champlain and along the 
Richelieu River in a steady march towards Montreal.  As if they needed further incentive, 
Continental forces who had seized the town of Skenesborough, at the southern tip of 
Lake Champlain, reported that British forces were outfitting an armed sloop to reassert 
British control over the lake system.256  British forces had docked the sloop at the fort of 
St. John’s, on the Richelieu River; to take or destroy it would constitute an invasion of 
Canada.  However, neither Allen nor Arnold blinked at the prospect. In fact, Allen could 
barely contain his men from marching northward, and Arnold informed Thomas Walker 
to expect American forces in Montreal shortly.257 
Having seized a schooner from a retired British officer, Allen and Arnold moved 
into position downriver from St. John’s.  On May 18 Arnold landed a force of 35 men to 
raid the fort, seize the armed sloop, and sink the remainder of the docked watercraft.258  
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At this point, the difference between Arnold’s boldness and Allen’s recklessness became 
apparent.  Realizing how far the company had moved ahead of its supply line, Arnold 
planned to fall back to Ticonderoga and use his newly acquired ships to guard the lake 
system against British incursion while the Continental Congress and military command 
determined a more systematic strategy for dealing with Canada.259  However, Allen, 
intoxicated by his recent successes, brushed aside Arnold’s warnings and returned to St. 
John’s with a 90-man force.  This warning proved to be prescient. The commander of the 
Montreal Garrison had already ordered Major Charles Preston to reinforce St. John’s, and 
only a timely warning allowed the Green Mountain Boys to escape the British regulars.260 
Carleton was informed of these actions on May 20, 1775, by Moses Hazen, a 
British reserve officer, land speculator, and seigneur who would later defect to the 
Continental cause. Two days later, the governor moved to Montreal to assume command 
of the city’s defense.261  Although the local seigneurs and the French merchants rallied to 
Carleton, the “Old Subjects” were largely sympathetic to the Americans. Carleton was 
even more chagrined when, despite his efforts to appease the “New Subjects,” the 
habitants refused to report. Carleton fumed at their ingratitude but tempered his anger 
with the recognition that the timing of the Quebec Act allowed “Old Subjects” to claim 
its true aim was to reconcile French Canadians to the possibility of serving under arms 
against the Americans.262  As mentioned earlier, Carleton’s requests to Bishop Briand to 
use his episcopal and pastoral authority to motivate the habitants were mainly effective in 
causing them to lose respect for the clergy, seeing them as creatures of the British.  
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Priests were held in awe by the French in general and the habitants in particular in the 
performance of their office, but their isolation from France and years without a bishop 
had engendered an independent streak among the French Canadians.  They developed the 
widespread opinion that the proper sphere of the clergy was in spiritual affairs, and they 
were not prepared to tolerate much interference by the priests in political affairs.  At 
length, through a combination of mildness toward the habitants, pleas from the clergy 
and French gentry, and threats toward the British merchants – at one point threatening to 
burn Montreal before Continental forces could arrive and withdraw to Quebec – Carleton 
was able to muster companies of militia in almost every district of Canada.  However, 
Carleton remained so uncertain of his troops’ loyalty that he delayed organizing them 
into an active battalion.263 
In the meantime, aware that Carleton only possessed 800 soldiers to defend all of 
Canada, Congress authorized General Philip Schuyler to order Brigadier General Richard 
Montgomery to move up the lake system toward St. John’s, Chambly, and ultimately 
Montreal.264  Moreover, George Washington, who had tirelessly promoted the invasion of 
Canada as necessary to deprive the British of a significant base of operations, informed 
Schuyler that Benedict Arnold was preparing a thousand men to march from 
Massachusetts through Maine to strike at Quebec from the east.   Arnold would 
ultimately command this force.265  At the end of August, Montgomery, prompted by 
reports that the British were preparing two war sloops to contest American control of the 
lake system, marched north. After skirmishing with Canadian and Native American 
                                                 
263 Lanctot, 58-59. 
264 Ibid., 63-64. 




forces, Montgomery secured a base on the Île-aux-Noix at the source of the Richelieu 
River.266 
From their new base of operations, the Continentals pursued two avenues of 
attack, one military and one in the realm of public relations.  The initial military focus 
was on the forts at St. John’s and Chambly, which was further north on the Richelieu 
River where it narrowed as it approached the St. Lawrence.  Initially lacking sufficient 
artillery to threaten even the relatively dilapidated forts, the American army roamed the 
territory between the two, harassing St. John’s in particular.  The first significant skirmish 
occurred on September 17, when a 200-man British force in pursuit of a Continental 
raiding party fell afoul of a 400-man Continental detachment under Colonel Timothy 
Bedel, which forced the British to fall back to St. John’s.267  Holding his ground, Bedel 
sent John Brown, now a major, and a 40-man reconnaissance unit to scout out the 
approaches to Montreal itself, where they stumbled across a seigneur and a party of 
militia and Indians with a supply caravan bound for St. John’s. Brown’s troops forced the 
militia to flight and seized the supplies.268  When word spread of this encounter, panic 
began to grip Montreal citizens as they realized that the Continentals were on the verge of 
controlling the southern shore of the St. Lawrence River. 
In the meantime, the Americans sought to recruit the habitants by distributing a 
circular amongst the residents of the village of Chambly and the surrounding areas 
calling them to join the Continentals and defend their liberty.269  Schuyler and 
Montgomery were aided in this endeavor by James Livingston, a Chambly merchant of 
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New York birth who had been in contact with the Americans since the taking of  
Ticonderoga.270  The Americans were initially pleased with the attitude of the habitants; 
they were cordial to the troops and eagerly sold  them supplies in return for payments in 
gold specie which the Continental Congress had given Montgomery.271  However, it soon 
became apparent that the habitants, for the most part, had little interest in entering the 
Continental service. The French Canadians remained skeptical of the Americans’ chances 
against the British and preferred to remain neutral. Noticing this, local Indians likewise 
demurred and withdrew to their villages.272  Livingston, assisted by Ethan Allen, finally 
succeeded in recruiting a small force; while Livingston numbered it at 300, the Loyalist 
Montreal notary Simon Sanguinet placed it at no more than 50.   Rumors among the 
habitants reported in Montreal estimated it at 150, which was probably closer to the 
truth.273  Even at that, Allen had to make extravagant promises to bind the Canadians to 
his side, which he was largely unable to fulfill.274 
For his part, Carleton had finally been able to assemble a 120-man militia unit 
under the seigneur de Longueil.  These were recruited through the combined influence of 
the other seigneurs, the clergy, and, most critically, the French merchants of Montreal, 
whom up to this point Carleton had largely disregarded.275  This force was able to 
reinforce St. John’s and make it impregnable to Continental attack.  Their appearance 
was even enough of a shock to the residents of the Richelieu valley that one parish, St-
Denis, sought and promptly received a pardon from Carleton for siding with the 
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Americans.276  Indeed, things seemed to be looking up for the beleaguered British 
governor.  On September 25, Ethan Allen, reckless as ever and led to believe that he 
would have significant Canadian militia support, decided to turn a recruiting trip to the 
town of Longueil, directly across the St. Lawrence from Montreal, into an all-out assault 
on the city. 277  However, the militia support failed to materialize, and Allen was left only 
with his own force combined with John Brown’s small detachment. Their 120-man unit 
was promptly overwhelmed by a force of British regulars and Loyalist Canadian militia 
under Prescott. British forces captured Allen and placed him in irons.278  Moreover, Île-
de-Noix turned out to be a less than ideal location for a semi-permanent camp. Nearly 
500 men, including General Schuyler, had to be sent back to New York to recover from 
illnesses contracted in the marshy surroundings. This left Montgomery as the sole 
operational American field commander on the ground in Canada.279  Further, 
Montgomery was coming uncomfortably close to the end of the hard currency with which 
he had been provided, causing him to have to skimp on supplies for his troops.280  With 
St. John’s holding out with the aid of the Montreal militia company, the Continental 
invasion was in danger of stalling just before the brutal Canadian winter began. 
Furthermore, Carleton remained firmly in control of Montreal and, in fact, finally ordered 
the arrest of Thomas Walker, who had been communicating and coordinating activities 
with Montgomery since the American invasion of Canada.281 
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However, Carleton’s control of Montreal was undone by the complacency of 
Major Preston, the commandant at Fort St. John’s, and the timidity of Major Stopford, in 
charge at Fort Chambly.  After Preston had retaken the fort from Allen, the armed 
schooner Royal Savage docked on the river beside the fort.  However, the schooner was 
not in fighting condition, serving mainly as a floating battery. Preston made no move to 
maintain or improve the ship, even though it could have largely prevented Continental 
troop movement had it been able to patrol.282  Finally, on October 16, the schooner 
capsized, affording Livingston the opportunity to slip two artillery pieces downriver past 
the fort to rendezvous with a force under John Brown and Jeremiah Duggan, Livingston’s 
second-in-command, at Fort Chambly.283  Carleton had been slow to follow up on his 
defeat of Allen outside Montreal, which depressed morale among the habitants and made 
them more receptive to the pleas of the Continentals. Duggan had finally recruited the 
300 habitants that Livingston had initially claimed.284  With this augmented force, 
Stopford was induced to surrender Fort Chambly after a siege of about two days. 
Incredibly, in that time, he had not thought to throw his gunpowder into the river or to 
spike his cannon, which represented a godsend to the Continentals.285  With supply 
worries resolved for the moment, Montgomery assembled his forces at St. John’s, where 
Preston was forced to surrender on November 3.286  The road to Montreal now lay wide 
open. Carleton along with his regulars withdrew from the city on November 10 while 
American forces rushed to Sorel to cut them off from Quebec. 
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What followed was a wild jumble of chance, farce, and determination in the face 
of sobering odds.    The indefatigable John Brown had intercepted the Quebec-bound 
British flotilla carrying the retreating British soldiers from Montreal at Sorel. where it had 
encountered crosswinds that had run several ships aground.  Having ingeniously 
convinced a credulous British officer that he had one battery in place at the mouth of the 
Richelieu River and another consisting of 32-pounders en route, when in fact the 
Continentals had no heavy artillery and even the limited guns at his disposal had not yet 
arrived, he induced Prescott to surrender the entire squadron.  Amazingly, the officer did 
not even insist on inspecting the guns, and Prescott failed to ask if he had seen them.287 
However, although the ships were invaluable in the later assault on Quebec, the 
grand prize had eluded the clever major.  After encountering the forward battery at Sorel, 
the ship captains had urged the governor to continue toward Quebec on his own to avoid 
capture.  One of them, an enterprising Frenchman named Bouchette, volunteered to 
smuggle him past the American blockade in a rowboat.288  Carleton, Bouchette, and two 
British soldiers made their way past Continental encampments on either side of the St. 
Lawrence posted specifically to catch them by lying in the bottom of the boat and 
paddling up the great river with their hands to minimize noise.289  The foursome crept into 
the outskirts of Trois-Rivières, about halfway between Montreal and Quebec, to stay the 
night in the home of a French Loyalist. An American scouting party occupied the house 
but Carleton was able to slip out disguised as a habitant.290  Finally, a British ship picked 
up Carleton’s group and took them into Quebec, landing on November 19.  In a final 
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twist of timing, they arrived five days after the second Continental army, led by Benedict 
Arnold from Massachusetts (and comprised of 800 of the originally planned 1000 
troops), reached the Plains of Abraham and Quebec’s city walls.291  Even had Arnold 
known who was on the ship, he had no way to attack British warships on the water.  The 
failure of the Continentals to capture Carleton was a crippling blow to their enterprise, for 
he was a commander uniquely suited to the turn that the campaign had taken. 
Indeed, had Carleton appeared in Quebec any later than he did, Canada might 
have been lost regardless.  Arnold’s appearance badly startled the lieutenant-governor, 
Hector-Thèophile Cramahé, and his military advisor, Colonel Allen MacLean of the 
Royal Highland Emigrants.  Like Carleton, Cramahé was sufficiently mistrustful of the 
Canadians that he would not authorize a sortie against Arnold’s force, even at its most 
vulnerable when fording the St. Lawrence.292  Arnold’s force had barely survived its trek 
along the Kennebec River in Maine and the Chaudière in southern Quebec, battling and 
frequently succumbing to frostbite and starvation.  The conditions were so severe that 
after Arnold’s second-in-command, Colonel Roger Enos, led a significant portion of the 
detachment back to Massachusetts; he was acquitted of desertion by a later court-martial 
convened upon his return.293  However, Arnold and his men were saved by habitants from 
the first villages they encountered, who fed them and went so far as to rescue those whom 
Arnold had no choice but to leave by the wayside as his troops barely had the strength to 
push themselves forward.294  When this ragged force finally arrived in front of the city 
gates, though, it was only the resolve of the French working classes to stand by their local 
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French and British leaders that prevented the Continental partisans in the merchant class 
from sending out terms of surrender.295 Heartened by the show of support, Cramahé and 
MacLean resolved to defend the city to the end, even though Admiral Lord Howe of the 
Royal Navy warned them that due to conditions on the St. Lawrence he could not bring 
them aid until spring.296  Lacking both strong local pro-American sentiment and any sort 
of artillery or siege equipment, Arnold withdrew to the nearby town of Pointe-aux-
Trembles. He sent word to Montgomery in Montreal that a siege would be necessary. 
However, Arnold held out hope that his sympathizers within the capital could find a way 
to open the gates for the waiting Continental forces.297 
Carleton removed this option immediately upon his arrival.  Having been accused 
of having lost the habitants due to having overly indulged the rights of the “Old Subject” 
turncoats and allowing them to spread propaganda through the countryside, he was 
determined not to lose Quebec in the same manner. Carleton was especially concerned 
after being informed by Cramahé of Continental sympathizers who had tried to surrender 
the city.298  Carleton declared martial law and ordered any eligible male not willing to 
join the militia by December 1 to leave the city with their families or be arrested as a spy. 
By this time  about 170 “Old Subjects” and a few Canadians had left, but Carleton’s 
proclamation  added motivation induced 53 more Canadians to join the militia rather than 
leave the city..299  Finally, he ordered all boats and ships, including the warships HMS 
Lizard and Hunter, docked for the winter and ordered the crews to help defend the city.300  
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His energy galvanized Quebec’s defenses, and his patience in not engaging in sorties and 
in continuing to fight with the French militia gave the besieging Americans no openings 
to take Quebec. 
Montgomery arrived at Pointe-aux-Trembles on December 5 with every resource 
that he felt Brigadier General David Wooster, left in command at Montreal, could spare. 
For instance, he brought along the troop transports captured from Prescott at Sorel.  
However, the St. Lawrence had frozen at Quebec, so there was no opportunity to use 
them in landings against the city.301  Between Arnold and Montgomery, they had between 
1200 and 1300 Continental troops and militia, along with around 500 Canadian militia. 
Yet as with Carleton, Montgomery was so uncertain of the habitants’ loyalty that he 
declined to use them in any offensive capacity.302  This placed the Continental forces at 
parity with the approximately 1750 soldiers available to Carleton in the city. These 
numbers gave Carleton the decided advantage because Carleton could rely on his 
Canadian militia to the extent that Montgomery could not.  Montgomery might have been 
able to compensate somewhat for his numerical disadvantage with sufficient artillery, but 
what he had at his disposal was too light for besieging a walled city, and beyond that, the 
frozen ground would not permit his gunners to secure their batteries.303  As if these 
logistical difficulties were not enough, smallpox began to rage through the camp. 
Conditions became so bad that Americans started to deliberately expose themselves to the 
virus to become ill and be sent back to New York.304  Above all loomed the January 1, 
1776 enlistment deadline for many Continental soldiers. While Montgomery would have 
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been within his rights to order the militia terms extended, he had little faith that the 
majority of his troops would not just ignore him and go home.305 
Regarding foodstuffs, the habitants outside the city were either sympathetic to the 
Americans or did not wish to antagonize them by trying to evade the siege. City 
defenders could not forage the countryside for supplies while Montgomery’s army was 
relatively well-supplied.306  However, Cramahé had foreseen these problems and laid in 
enough supplies to see Quebec through a winter siege, if not comfortably. In the 
meantime, both Montgomery and Arnold had nearly run through their stores of cash, and 
their supporters in Montreal were likewise becoming overdrawn.307 Long-term, the 
invaders had neither the specie to sustain themselves nor the superior force necessary to 
extract enough supplies from the habitants by force, which would have been needed to 
get them to accept Continental paper money. 
Bereft of options, and realizing that the situation in Quebec would change 
radically once the Royal Navy could reach the city in the spring, Montgomery decided to 
undertake a desperate full-scale assault on Quebec.  On December 31, he divided his 
forces in a three-pronged attack. Livingston, the Canadian militia colonel, led his men in 
a feint on one of the gates to the city. Simultaneously Arnold attempted to climb the steep 
road that led to the Upper City of Quebec. On a third front, Montgomery led an assault on 
the Lower City along the narrow approach from Wolfe’s Cove, where the famed general 
of the French and Indian War had landed his men in preparation for his assault on the city 
in 1759.308   
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The attack was a disaster.  Carleton had prepared blockhouses and barricades 
concealing cannon loaded with grapeshot at both approaches to the city. Furthermore, 
Montgomery was killed, and Arnold severely wounded within the first minutes of the 
assault.  The few Continental soldiers that managed to evade the barricades and spill into 
the city were quickly mopped up by the regulars and the militia.309  Livingston’s force of 
habitants performed better than expected, but their lack of equipment and training left 
them with no realistic chance of seriously threatening the walls.  The lack of overall 
command and control likewise left them with no way of knowing whom or where to 
reinforce.  As a result, most of the unit was quickly taken, prisoner.310 Remarkably, 
despite his injury and with nearly 500 of his soldiers killed or taken prisoner, Arnold 
managed to organize a retreat.311 
Despite the severity of this blow, the Continentals were not ready to write off 
Canada as a loss.  They still held Montreal and even threatened Quebec.  If the habitants 
could help improve their supply situation, they could reinforce their defensive positions 
in the spring.  However, General Wooster, whom Montgomery had left as commandant 
of Montreal, was not as adept as Montgomery in handling the Canadians.  In response to 
renewed Loyalist activity in the wake of Montgomery’s defeat, Wooster had several 
prominent Loyalists arrested, holding most at Fort Chambly but sending a few to New 
York.  This contrasted uncomfortably with Carleton’s gentle treatment of Continental 
sympathizers and, not for the first time, left the Americans vulnerable to the charge of 
hypocrisy.312  Moreover, the Connecticut native and graduate of Yale College, at that time 
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a bastion of Puritanism, had little patience for the Catholic faith to begin with, and was 
rapidly frustrated by the unwillingness of French Catholic clergy to promote the 
American cause.  While there is no evidence that he acted against any priests, he publicly 
threatened to treat recalcitrant priests as British agents.313  As every political actor 
involved had predicted, this inflamed the passions of the French. While the habitants felt 
entitled to chastise their priests for overstepping their bounds, it was an entirely different 
matter for the Protestant Bastonnais to threaten them with harm.  Above all, though, the 
chronic lack of hard currency hindered Wooster from assembling supplies for the army at 
Quebec, a problem made more acute by the arrival of New York troops in Montreal.  
When the habitants and French merchants balked at taking Continental notes, the 
Yorkers simply took what goods they needed, thus squandering the goodwill that 
Montgomery had so meticulously cultivated.314   
As word spread of Montgomery’s death and Wooster’s severity, the attitude of the 
habitants hardened against the Continentals.  Carleton’s gentle treatment of both the 
habitants and captured Continental troops served to improve his reputation amongst 
French and British Canadians.  With the arrival of British reinforcements in May of 1776 
and the failure of the commission sent by Congress to engage the citizens of Montreal in 
establishing a popular government, the Americans fell back from Canada and reached 
Lake Champlain in late June 1776. 
Much like the invasion of Canada, Clark’s 1778 Illinois expedition was preceded 
and facilitated by a water campaign. This conflict was waged by Captain James Willing 
against British settlements on the lower Mississippi River.  Leaving Fort Pitt on January 
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11, 1778, Willing and 26 men embarked down the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers.  Their 
intent was to seize the Natchez District of British West Florida, including the towns of 
Natchez and Manchac, and then move on to take the significant towns of the Tombigbee 
District – Mobile and the capital of Pensacola.315  In a July 4, 1778 letter to Haldimand, 
Rocheblave reported that Willing had recruited “three hundred rogues,”  seized or 
destroyed over 1.5 million piastres in goods and “destroyed English Arkansas, which is 
no longer anything but a desert.”316   
After having ravaged the British settlements on the lower Mississippi, Willing 
followed Congress’s instructions to march to New Orleans, purchase a large number of 
supplies and entice the Spanish governor, Bernardo Galvez, to support his planned 
expedition to the Florida settlements.  While in New Orleans, Willing lost control of his 
men, who spent most of their time there in drunken brawling and debauchery.  As a 
result, Galvez politely put off Willing.  Only after Spain had formally declared war on 
Britain would Galvez himself lead a Spanish expedition to take Mobile and Pensacola.317  
Rocheblave wrote to Haldimand with malicious satisfaction that Willing’s rapaciousness, 
along with his duplicity in refusing to pay some of his crew, resulted in the loss of the 
territory that he had taken. The men Willing had recruited,slipped back to Natchez and 
Manchac and helped the British settlers kill or eject the men that Willing had left to hold 
the towns.318  Willing’s adventure was not completely without consequence, though; he 
surprised and captured an 18-gun frigate that could have been deployed to the Illinois 
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Country. He also seized a large cache of supplies which he sent to St. Louis in 
anticipation of further campaigns in the spring.319  
Just after having approved Willing’s expedition, on January 12, 1778 Clark 
received official ratification of his plan to invade the Illinois Country in the form of 
orders in council from Williamsburg:  “You are to proceed with all convenient speed to 
enroll seven companies of Soldiers to consist of fifty men each, to be officered in the 
usual manner & armed most properly for the Enterprize & with this done attack the 
British post at Kaskaskia.”320  The mission was to be kept a secret to prevent Illinois 
villagers from mustering, or even more dangerously from contacting their allies among 
the Illinois Confederacy and other Algonquin tribes, such as the Piankeshaw. 
Accordingly, Clark’s troops were not to be told of their true destination until the march 
began. Not even General Edward Hand, in command at Fort Pitt where Clark’s 
expedition was outfitted, was to be informed.321 
Clark encountered difficulties with recruitment, the more so since he was not at 
liberty to discuss the actual object of his mission, only that it was meant to protect 
Kentucky. As s a result, men from Pennsylvania and Virginia refused to join, preferring 
to remain to defend their own colonies.322  He sent messengers and money to Kentucky, 
and soon received word that Captains Joseph Bowman and Leonard Helm had each 
raised one as well.323  Major William Smith reported that he had raised four additional 
companies. Yet upon Clark’s arrival in Kentucky, he discovered that Smith had received 
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orders to reinforce eastern Virginia and could only spare one company under Captain 
James Dillard. As a result, the 350 men for which the operation had been planned had 
been reduced to 150.324  Clark moved his men to Corn Island, on the Ohio just downriver 
of modern-day Louisville, for training. The seclusion of the island provided secrecy and 
made desertion difficult. Despite these precautions, Clark was required to spend a few 
days tracking down a small band of deserters that had found a spot in the river where they 
could wade ashore.325 
Clark’s initial intention was to start by taking Vincennes, which was in the center 
of Indian activity at it related to Kentucky.  However, with his reduced numbers and 
knowing that Vincennes had 400 militia under arms, he decided that it was less risky to 
begin with the towns along the Mississippi.326  Clark reasoned that there were fewer large 
Indian villages in the pays des Illinois who might come to the aid of the French and 
British.  Also, if things went badly, his force could find refuge across the Mississippi in 
Spanish territory.327  Accordingly, Clark and his men started out for the Illinois Country 
under cover of darkness on June 24, 1778.  They landed at the ruins of the old French 
Fort Massac, forty miles upriver of the Ohio’s juncture with the Mississippi.328  Clark 
ruled out making the voyage entirely on water as the journey up the Mississippi would be 
arduous, and they would almost certainly be seen.329  
After making their way inland from Fort Massac, Clark realized that his 
immediate difficulty would be finding his way to Kaskaskia, his first destination. There 
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was a well-traveled road from Vincennes to Kaskaskia, but the French-era road from Fort 
Massac was long gone. Fortunately for Clark, he ran into a hunting party led by John 
Duff, who claimed knowledge of Kaskaskia and offered to lead him there.330  Curiously, 
in the 1790s there were stories of a counterfeiter and river pirate named Duff that had 
operated out of Cave-in-Rock, slightly upriver from Fort Massac. As such, it is possible 
that this encounter was less random chance than a reconnaissance mission on Duff’s part 
to determine the identity of Clark’s troops.331  It might even be suspected that Clark had a 
previous arrangement with Duff, although Clark refers in his account to “their surprise 
having been owing to lack of knowledge who we were.”332  At any rate, Clark selected 
one of Duff’s party, a man named Saunders, to guide him to Kaskaskia.  Even for an 
experienced hunter, the way from Fort Massac to Kaskaskia was not easy to find in the 
largely featureless prairie. At one point, Clark, suspecting that Saunders might be a 
double-agent, threatened to have him shot if he failed to quickly locate the trail again.333  
Eventually, on July 4, 1788, the guide finally delivered Clark and his men to their 
destination. 
On the night of July 4, having ascertained that there were no Indian parties in the 
village, Clark and his men slipped across the Kaskaskia River and took up positions 
around the town. Moving quickly, they then burst in on Rocheblave and his wife in their 
bedroom and placed him under arrest while ordering the townspeople to stay in their 
homes.334  Through the next day, Clark treated the villagers brusquely, shackling a few 
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militia leaders and only reluctantly allowing a meeting at the church.  After the church 
meeting, Father Gibault and a few of the leading townspeople approached Clark 
nervously and asked that if they were to be expelled and if so, would they be allowed to 
pack a few necessities and leave unharmed.335  Having brought the townspeople to a sense 
of despair, Clark delivered a tour-de-force performance, demanding to know why the 
villagers thought that Americans were so savage as to kill and plunder indiscriminately?  
He assured Father Gibault and the other town leaders that everyone in the village was at 
liberty to depart except for the household of Gabriel Cerré. The French trader, who was 
in St. Louis preparing for a trading mission to Fort Michilimackinac at the time of Clark’s 
arrival, was known to be one of the former commandant’s supporters.   Clark then played 
his trump card:  the news, delivered to him immediately before his departure from 
Kentucky, that France had entered into a formal alliance with the colonies.336   
The effect on the townspeople was electric.  Not only did they enthusiastically 
align themselves with Clark and the Continental cause, but Gibault and other prominent 
men offered their services as ambassadors.  They rode with Clark’s men to Prairie du 
Rocher, St-Philippe, Cahokia, and ultimately as far as Vincennes on the Wabash to 
convince the habitants to throw in their lot with the Americans.  Motivated by concern 
for his family and mercantile interests, Cerré returned to Kaskaskia and surrendered to 
American forces. After vigorous questioning, Clark announced he was satisfied with 
Cerré’s loyalty. Not surprisingly, Cerré quickly offered his services and stores to Clark.337  
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In the space of a few weeks, Clark had occupied British Illinois from the Mississippi to 
the Wabash with less than 200 men, and without firing a shot in anger.   
Although busy dealing with French settlers on the Lower Mississippi, Clark did 
not neglect the region’s Indian tribes.  The Kaskaskia, Cahokia, and Peoria would follow 
the lead of their French friends and relatives. Kaskaskia chief Jean-Baptiste Ducoigne 
would become a friend and staunch ally to Clark. But tribes such as the Potawatomi, the 
Winnebagos, the Sauk, and the Ojibwe would require some convincing.  Accordingly, 
Clark held a council of the chiefs at Cahokia in the fall of 1778, where he put every 
lesson he had learned in years of Indian warfare in Kentucky to use.338  He gave the 
assembled chiefs an explanation for the state of war between the colonies and Britain and 
demanded that they immediately declare whether or not they were at war with the 
Continentals.  His skillful presentation overawed the Indians into protestations of 
friendship and promises of neutrality, although there was an attempt by a small group of 
Winnebagos paid by British agents to capture Clark at his Cahokia headquarters.339 
This at least was Clark’s account of the seizure of the pays des Illinois. The 
details were largely corroborated by other reports, including eyewitnesses that provided 
their testimony to later historians such as John Reynolds.  However, it may not have been 
a complete record, as Clark was writing for posterity and was conscious of his image as a 
hardened man of action. In looking more closely at his account, it may be that Clark’s 
victories were the result of careful groundwork being laid well beforehand.  Clark had 
spoken of the alternative of retreating to the Spanish bank of the Mississippi if Kaskaskia 
were more vigorously defended than anticipated. In fact, upon reaching Kaskaskia, Clark 
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immediately sent word to Oliver Pollock in New Orleans to draw upon American credit 
and to inquire after the American stores sent to St. Louis in the wake of the Willing 
expedition.340  These orders indicate that Clark remained in contact with the Spanish, 
even if at arm’s length.  In particular, given the known sensitivity of the Spanish to 
unauthorized incursions of their territory, Clark would not have contemplated making a 
retreat into Spanish Louisiana if he were not sure of Spanish support.   
Although depicted by Clark as helpless ingenues, Gibault and Cerré were 
formidable individuals.  Gibault had sustained a lengthy conflict with his bishop and 
Cerré, as noted earlier, was still in the habit as a middle-aged man of personally directing 
his caravans over the dangerous and challenging route from Kaskaskia to Montreal.  In 
Gibault’s case in particular, Briand had suspended priests for merely providing the 
sacraments to rebellious habitants.  Gibault could expect severe episcopal sanctions for 
the material support of Continental forces that he was preparing to provide.  Both were 
also in constant contact with Spanish government officials in St. Louis and Ste. 
Genevieve. Clark himself noted that a request for Cerré’s safe-conduct came from de 
Leyba in St. Louis and was counter-signed by most of the merchants in the city.341  The 
extravagant lengths to which Cerré. Gibault, and even Charles Gratiot went to assist 
Clark, along with the seeming willingness of their decisions, could thus in large part be 
explained regarding Spanish influence.  Clark’s mastery of the drama that unfolded in 
Kaskaskia is undisputed, but if he had advance knowledge of the motives of some of the 
key players, it would have made playing his role much easier. 
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Even concerning his Indian diplomacy, Clark benefited from the fact that the 
Spanish had set the stage.  As noted previously, Rocheblave had long and consistently 
warned Hamilton in Detroit, Gage in New York, and Carleton and Haldimand in Quebec 
that the Spanish had been sending agents upriver and even across the Mississippi to 
agitate the Indians against British interests.  In this context, the following remark by 
Clark takes on added significance:  “The friendly correspondence between the Spaniards 
and ourselves was also much to our advantage since everything the Indians heard from 
them was favorable to us.”342  If Richard White was correct in assessing that Clark’s use 
of the imagery of the middle ground was inept and wrong-footed, the long and patient 
work by the Spanish might have gone a long way toward mitigating whatever damage 
was done. 
The British made two attempts to dislodge the Continentals from the pays des 
Illinois.  One was organized almost immediately upon receiving news of the fall of the 
Illinois Country. On October 8, 1778, Henry Hamilton departed Detroit with around 
thirty British regulars and fifty Canadian militia, along with a gunboat that capsized 
almost immediately upon launch.343  While en route, Hamilton stopped to meet with the 
chiefs of the various Indian nations along the way. In his negotiations with different 
chiefs, Hamilton displayed a diplomatic suavity born of years of trade that Clark could 
hardly hope to match.  At one point, Hamilton praised and encouraged the loyalty of the 
Onset Indian tribe toward the Great Spirit, even though the ritual lighting of fires might 
have revealed their location.  Contrary to his fearsome reputation as the “Hair-Buyer” for 
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paying bounties to Indian warriors for scalps, Hamilton also encouraged humanity toward 
captives.344  Hamilton’s efforts resulted in the attachment of about 400 Indians to his 
force, and on December 17, he entered Vincennes without resistance, taking Captain 
Helm and his company prisoner.345 
Hamilton intended to move immediately upon Kaskaskia.  However, his men 
were sufficiently exhausted by the cold and icy trek from Detroit to Vincennes that he 
determined to lay in for the winter in Vincennes, and move on the Mississippi villages 
after receiving supplies and reinforcements in the spring. In the meantime, Hamilton 
ordered that no one was allowed in or out of Vincennes.346  However, his hopes of quietly 
passing the winter in the Illinois Country without Clark’s knowledge were dashed when a 
British patrol apprehended Francis Vigo, an Italian merchant based in St. Louis, whom 
Clark had retained to deliver supplies to Helm’s company and to report back on 
conditions in Vincennes.  As Vigo was a Spanish subject and there was no conclusive 
proof of his spying for Clark, Hamilton was forced to release him with orders not to 
report anything of what he had seen in Vincennes on his return journey to St. Louis.347  
Vigo agreed and carried out his pledge to the letter; however, upon reaching St. Louis 
and conferring with de Leyba, he immediately set out for Kaskaskia to report to Clark.348   
Like Montgomery in 1775, Clark had a pair of bad options before him. He could 
either wait for better conditions and allow the British time to reinforce or he could make a 
desperate gamble and attack in the worst conditions.  Like Montgomery, Clark chose the 
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more hazardous course.  Such an assault would have been impossible for Clark’s force 
alone, which after leaving behind minimal garrisons for Kaskaskia and Cahokia 
numbered under one hundred men. Fortunately for Clark, the French militia in both 
towns responded enthusiastically to his call for volunteers, which boosted his force to 170 
troops.  Marching across the cold prairie in the dead of winter, Clark and his force found 
the Wabash River and its tributaries flooded well over their banks and were forced to 
wade through miles of near-freezing water to gain their destination.349   
Once at Vincennes, Clark found to his chagrin that the keelboat that he sent 
ahead, named Willing after his southern benefactor, had not arrived with his supplies or 
his cannon. Clark was forced to conduct a siege of Fort Sackville, outside of Vincennes, 
with no artillery.350  However, Clark had at least three advantages over Montgomery.  The 
first was that Fort Sackville and Vincennes, unlike Quebec, had no high, imposing walls, 
which meant that all points of the fort were accessible to small arms fire.  The second, 
related to the first, was that Clark had some sharpshooters that were experts with the 
Kentucky long rifle.  This negated Hamilton’s advantage in artillery, as Clark’s snipers 
would shoot Hamilton’s artillerymen through the gunports of the fort every time they saw 
movement in one of them, and before long no one would accept the duty of manning the 
guns.351  Finally, and crucially, neither the Canadian militia nor the habitants of 
Vincennes would form the backbone of the resistance to the invaders.  
Indeed, the leaders of the local militia showed Clark caches of weapons hidden 
when Hamilton had ordered the townspeople disarmed, and the habitants remained in 
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their homes and made no attempt to supply the garrison.352  Moreover, not expecting 
trouble during the winter, Hamilton had released the Indians that had accompanied him to 
Vincennes. As such, Hamilton only retained his regulars and the French militia, and the 
militia was not enthusiastic about firing on friends and family from Illinois.353 
After days of sustained fusillades from the Continentals, Hamilton’s last hope of 
timely reinforcements was dashed when a party of Ottawa warriors allied with the British 
was intercepted by Clark’s men, lined up near the fort, and tomahawked to death, 
according to Hamilton by Clark personally.354  With only a month’s supply left in the fort 
and Clark promising to slaughter the garrison if it continued to resist, a promise 
graphically reinforced by the fate of the Ottawa warriors, Hamilton sued for terms.  He 
surrendered the fort on February 25, 1779.355  The French militia was paroled and allowed 
to return to Detroit, but Hamilton and the British regulars, along with Rocheblave at 
Kaskaskia, were sent as prisoners to Williamsburg. 
The second attempt to reclaim the Illinois Country came in 1780, as part of an 
ambitious campaign devised by Lord George Germain, the British Secretary of State for 
the Colonies.356  On February 17, Patrick Sinclair, lieutenant governor at 
Michilimackinac, sent Captain Emmanuel Hesse to the portage between the Wisconsin 
and Fox Rivers just north of modern Madison, Wisconsin, to gather the local tribes into 
an attack force.  Three other British regulars joined him, followed by a small group of 
Canadian traders and militia, and war parties of Ojibwe under Chief Matchekewis and 
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Sioux under Chief Wapasha.357  This force was to move down the Fox and Mississippi 
Rivers and split just north of St. Louis.  The Ojibwe along with trader Jean-Marie 
Ducharme, would then move east to attack Cahokia.  At the same time the British 
regulars and the Sioux, along with trader Joseph Calve and a war party of Sauk and Fox 
picked up from their main town of Saukenuk, would continue down the western bank to 
attack St. Louis.358  A third party, under Captain Charles-Michel de Langlade, was to 
assemble at the Chicago portage and travel down the Illinois River to rendezvous with the 
main force.  However, a Potawatomi tribe under Chief Blackbird, who was partial to the 
Illinois French, prevented Langlade’s force from reaching the mouth of Illinois until after 
the battle was over.359 
On April 6, a messenger from Fort San Carlos at the mouth of the Missouri River 
appeared in St. Louis to inform de Leyba, the Spanish lieutenant governor, that an attack 
in force was approaching down the Mississippi.360  At about the same time, on April 11, 
Gratiot left Cahokia to hand-deliver an urgent message from prominent citizens of the 
town to Clark, who at the time was overseeing the construction of Fort Jefferson at the 
juncture of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. The Cahokia leaders had been receiving 
reports of the war party from traders since that February, and feared that an attack was 
imminent unless he arrived with troops to defend the city.361  Clark rushed back to 
Cahokia, while de Leyba had artillery pieces and militia brought up from Ste. Genevieve 
and ordered a rudimentary Martello tower erected at the western edge of the city as a 
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simple battery, along with entrenchments that almost surrounded the city.362  Clark 
conferred with de Leyba in St. Louis upon his arrival on May 25, but the meeting mainly 
allowed each to give the other moral support.  Despite a close friendship that had 
developed between the two since their first meeting shortly after Clark’s arrival in 
Kaskaskia, neither had any resources available to help the other.363 
The attacks came the day after Clark reached Cahokia.  In each case, the assaults 
began with Indians killing anyone they encountered in the large common fields that 
surrounded both towns.364  In St. Louis, the cannon from Ste. Genevieve had been 
mounted on top of the Martello tower.  While the age of the pieces and their awkward 
angle prevented them from inflicting many casualties, the unexpected artillery barrage 
blunted the ferocity of the initial Sioux, Sauk, and Fox attack.365  The Indians swarmed 
the entrenchments, but only found one point weak enough to exploit.  By the time it was 
discovered, though, Calve and the Sauk and Fox, who had only reluctantly joined the 
expedition, had fallen back. The Sioux lacked the numbers to exploit the opening and had 
to fall back as well.366  In Cahokia, there were no similar fortifications, but a large stone 
building behind the Church of the Holy Family provided cover to which Clark’s men 
could fall back after a defensive volley.  After the initial attack was blunted, the Ojibwe, 
who had been promised easy plunder, melted away.367  Numerous random attacks against 
the Illinois towns would be undertaken over the next year or so, but after May of 1780, 
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Richard Montgomery and George Rogers Clark each began an invasion of a 
largely unknown environment in order to prevent an enemy from using its resources 
against their fledgling nation. Although waged in different theaters hundreds of miles 
apart, the course of those invasions followed very similar lines.  In each case, there was 
an initially tentative and fearful reaction from the inhabitants in both regions, followed by 
a warm welcome and easy successes by both Continental forces. In each case, there was a 
sudden reversal of fortune as British civilian and military leaders executed skillful 
countermoves.  Both Montgomery and Clark approached the point of desperation, and 
each gambled everything on a single roll of the dice.  Yet Montgomery was cut down in 
the opening moments of an ignominious defeat, most likely at the hands of one of the 
men he believed he had come to liberate from tyranny, while Clark lived to become the 
hero of Illinois.   
This work has examined the cultural and political background of each of these 
invasions, separated by only three years, to determine the single factor among many that 
was most responsible for this outcome.  In each respect examined, the most outstanding 
difference between Montgomery’s invasion of Canada and Clark’s invasion of the pays 
des Illinois has been the looming presence in the latter of an imperial power inimical to 
Britain’s interests, and that power’s willingness to adopt the maxim that “the enemy of 
my enemy is my friend.” 
It was certainly the case from the end of the French and Indian War onward that 
Britain, France, and Spain recognized that the state of their relations was what in modern 




of the Treaty of Paris (1763) which ended that war, revenge would be topmost on the 
minds of the two defeated Bourbon powers.  This attitude might reasonably be expected 
to persist among the subjects of France left under the dominion of the British victors, 
especially in Canada, where General Wolfe’s razing of the Quebec countryside in an 
effort to pacify the habitants and the expulsion of Acadian settlers were still fresh 
memories.  However, in the absence of any alternatives and with the generally 
compassionate rule by Murray and Carleton, French Canadians slowly began to accept 
their new reality.  Despite the fact that several British officials on the Lower Mississippi 
commandants had been haughty and corrupt, it might be expected that the habitants along 
the Mississippi would eventually do the same, especially since they had not directly 
suffered the pains of war as had the Canadians.  The fact that Clark was able to exploit 
the still lingering resentment of Louisiana settlers towards British authorities is a 
testament to the fact that unlike in Canada, most of the natural interlocutors between the 
British and the French “New Subjects,” the wealthy landowners and merchants, were 
enticed away by the Spanish in St. Louis.  These, in turn, kept up a constant whispering 
campaign on behalf of the Spanish against the British to those Louisiana settlers who 
remained. 
The backbone of British support in Quebec was the clergy, which had expected to 
be suppressed under the militantly Protestant British but had been pleasantly surprised the 
generous accommodations offered by British colonial officials.  Being new to Canada 
and not completely understanding the changes in the Catholic world since the English 
Reformation in 1520, the British assumed that the dispensation to allow a bishop in 




of freedom that the priests had experienced prior to the appointment of Bishop Briand, 
combined with the Jansenist strain that had penetrated even the traditionalist stronghold 
of Quebec, caused many to feel oppressed by the resumption of traditional Catholic 
order.  One of the malcontents, Pierre Gibault, had been sent to the pays des Illinois.  
While the Spanish were no less religiously orthodox than were the French Canadians, the 
nearest bishop to St. Louis was in Havana. As such, Church officials had less control over 
the French Catholic population of Spanish Louisiana. As a result, Gibault would have 
been inclined to serve Spanish interests even if Clark had not personally charmed him. 
With the colonies having even less patience for the Catholic hierarchy than Britain itself, 
Gibault doubtless anticipated that he would continue to enjoy the freedom that had 
prevailed in Canada prior to Briand’s appointment and that he currently enjoyed in 
Spanish Upper Louisiana.  It hardly seems like a coincidence that Gibault moved 
permanently to the Spanish side of the Mississippi shortly after John Carroll was 
appointed Bishop of Baltimore in 1790 and formed a close working relationship with the 
same Briand that had tried to ostracize him during his 1775 Montreal stay.1  In the 
meantime, with Father Meurin in semi-retirement, the clergy was no more available as 
interlocutors for the British than were the French merchants or the long-gone Illinois 
seigneurs. 
Indian military involvement in both invasions was minimal. Those tribes that 
participated in the conflicts usually did so out of choice. In general, tribal leaders had no 
desire to become involved in a war that did not concern them.  Both Montgomery and 
Carleton were disinclined to employ Native American warriors in combat  in Canada.  In 
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the pays des Illinois, Clark primarily declined to recruit Indians out of practical 
considerations of trying to distinguish Indian friend from foe in the heat of battle.2  The 
exception to this reluctance was the group of officers in command in the western reaches 
of British North America:  Hamilton in Detroit, Captain Arent de Peyster in 
Michilimackinac, and Rocheblave in Kaskaskia.  These men had served on the frontier 
for years and often worked with Native Americans in their respective spheres of 
influence but found themselves hindered in their ability to do so against the Americans.  
Rocheblave repeated his explanation for Native American reluctance fight the American 
to anyone who would listen: the Spanish had been using French agents trusted by the 
Indians to dissuade them from helping the British.  It took Hamilton’s personal 
intervention on a tour of the region between Detroit and Vincennes to gain any ground 
with local tribes, but Clark’s arrival in January of 1776 hindered any future British-Indian 
collaboration. The northern tribes – the Sioux, Ojibwe, Sauk, and Fox – finally took a 
direct hand in the war in 1780, but again to little effect.  By this time the Spanish had 
successfully cut off the British from their traditional Indian auxiliaries. 
In the realm of commerce, both Canada and the Illinois Country had British “Old 
Subject” merchants that chafed at restrictions which they perceived favored the French. 
“New Subject” merchants likewise saw the British as the only actors capable of imposing 
the sort of stability necessary for commerce to flourish.  Indeed, Gabriel Cerré had early 
on earned his reputation as one of British commandant Rocheblave’s strongest 
supporters.  However, one critical difference between the commercial environments of 
Canada and Illinois made it thinkable for merchants in the latter to prefer the unknown to 
                                                 




the known. The French merchants in Quebec and Montreal were utterly dependent upon 
London as a market for their goods, whereas it was easier for French merchants in 
Kaskaskia and Cahokia to trade with St. Louis and New Orleans than any British town or 
post.  With Spain aligned with the Continentals, it was simply good business sense to 
come to terms with the Americans, as the Spanish officials in St. Louis and French 
friends and their relatives in St. Louis and Ste. Genevieve doubtless frequently argued. 
When the conflict finally came, the Spanish tested the limits of neutrality before 
finally committing to the conflict in 1779.  During the invasion of the Illinois Country, 
Spain let it be known that Clark could retreat to Spanish territory in the event that he was 
defeated at Kaskaskia, although few likely knew better that de Leyba how unlikely that 
event was to occur.  Spain provided credit through Oliver Pollock to Clark and allowed 
the Continentals to use St. Louis as an entrepot for war goods.  It was a Spanish subject, 
Francis Vigo, that reconnoitered Vincennes and brought back word of its capture to 
Clark, with the explicit blessing of the lieutenant governor in St. Louis.  Spain used the 
influence of its prominent French citizens, primarily the Chouteaus, to prevail upon Cerré 
and Gratiot to extend Clark virtually unlimited credit as well.  Oddly enough, the Spanish 
were able to provide perhaps their greatest help to the Americans by the exposure of St. 
Louis to the threat of invasion, which diverted substantial British resources away from 
Cahokia and the remainder of the villages on the east bank of the Mississippi.  By 
contrast, Montgomery in Canada had no avenue of retreat other than back to New York, 
no agents with complete freedom of movement, and above all no limitless credit. He was 




To be sure, there were other factors involved that distinguished the Canadian 
campaign from that of the Illinois Country.  Montgomery’s invasion was conceived and 
executed as a project of the Continental Congress, whereas Clark’s was commissioned by 
the State of Virginia. This meant that Montgomery was at least initially far better-
financed but was also more closely monitored and pressured by politicians than was 
Clark.  As mentioned earlier, Quebec was far more formidable as a fortress than was Fort 
Sackville.  Carleton and Hamilton were certainly different as commanders. Carleton 
would have been no more likely than was Hamilton to launch an attack against Kaskaskia 
after a hard march in mid-November, but if he had retained the services of the Indians at 
all, the cautious Carleton would almost certainly have kept the main body near to hand, 
not trusting the weather as his only shield.   
If the involvement of Spain was the critical factor, it must be said that the lack of 
a third interested party was arguably to the long-term benefit of the French in Canada.  
Their Illinois brethren rapidly tired of the chaos that grew in the wake of brutal and 
corrupt American administrators, worse than those that the British had ever provided, and 
the massive influx of American farmers, merchants, and land speculators into Canada.3 
Those who were able moved to St. Louis, but with the Louisiana Purchase it proved only 
a temporary refuge.  By the 1840s French influence waned in St. Louis as well as the 
Illinois villages.  In the modern day, only small pockets of French culture and language 
remain in the Midwest, in remote areas such as the Illinois village of Prairie du Rocher 
and Missouri’s Old Mines region.4  In Canada, by contrast, Carleton’s accommodation 
policy persisted through the years, and now Montreal is second only to Paris in terms of 
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the largest francophone cities in the world.  Montgomery’s vision of a free French people 
in Canada finally arrived, although not nearly in the form he imagined. 
Despite the friendship between Clark and de Leyba, which ended with the latter’s 
death shortly after the battle of St. Louis in 1780, the Spanish did not aid the Americans 
out of any love for them or their cause.  Their purpose was to strike at Britain; once that 
was accomplished, their attitude toward the new nation swiftly changed.  Shortly after the 
war, the Spanish prohibited American river travel to New Orleans as they had done with 
the British previously, although the prohibition was rarely enforced against Illinois 
merchants.5  In early 1781, Spanish officials received an unusual call from Cahokia for 
assistance in a matter concerning their friends and relatives to the north.  After Clark’s 
departure in the wake of the battle of Cahokia, relationships between his lieutenants and 
the French had deteriorated rapidly. The Spanish accordingly launched an attack against 
Fort St. Joseph in conjunction with the Potawatomi under Chief Blackbird and planted 
the Spanish flag there.  This was presumably done to establish a Spanish claim to 
portions of the Old Northwest, which caused some discomfiture at the peace negotiations 
at the end of the Revolution, although nothing ultimately came of it.6   
Finally, in 1796 Zenon Trudeau, lieutenant governor at St. Louis, convinced New 
Orleans governor Esteban Miro to allow him to solve the problem of the underpopulation 
of Spanish Upper Louisiana when compared to the burgeoning population of Kentucky 
by inducing Americans to move to the Spanish side of the Mississippi.  Given the 
generous land grants available, many pioneers became Spanish subjects, including Daniel 
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Boone and his family.7  Boone shared Thomas Jefferson’s opinion that importing Anglo-
Americans would hasten the end of Spanish Louisiana rather than delay it. Yet such 
speculation was rendered moot by Jefferson himself in executing the Louisiana Purchase 
in 1804.8   
Regardless of motives and future conflicts, though, Spain’s intervention on behalf 
of Clark and the colonies would change the shape of history.  Without it, the nascent 
United States might very well have been negotiating its western border at the eastern 
edge of Indiana instead of the Mississippi, and Kentucky may have been surrounded to 
the north by Britain and to the south by Spain.  As things stood, the United States gained 
the broad frontier it needed to begin its push westward.
                                                 
7 Robert Morgan, Boone:  A Biography (Chapel Hill, NC:  Algonquin Books, 2007), 390. 
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